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Freedom of contract is significantly restricted in the market for professional
services. Under the so-called “corporate practice doctrine,” professionals
such as doctors and lawyers are prohibited from practicing within corporate
entities, and laypeople are likewise prohibited from investing in professional
service firms. Defenders of this prohibition argue that it can be justified as a
means of protecting professional independence and thereby increasing the
quality of care. In fact, however, the available evidence suggests that
investment restrictions are counterproductive to their stated goal. In practice,
these restrictions raise costs and reduce access without measurably improving
the quality of service at all.
This Article examines why, in spite of significant criticism, the doctrine
remains alive in the twenty-first century in both medicine and law, preventing
the professions from reaping the benefits of outside investment. Legislative
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solutions have largely failed; U.S. jurisdictions universally prohibit corporate
practice in the legal field, and a significant (and resurging) minority of states
continues to apply corporate practice restrictions in medicine. In both fields,
the possibility of reaching a political solution is hindered by protectionist
impulses.
This Article therefore proposes a challenge to the doctrine on constitutional
grounds. The constitutional case in favor of private ordering is not an easy one
to make: current constitutional doctrine defers heavily to state choices in the
economic sphere, even when those choices lack any empirical evidence of
rationality. Nevertheless, there has been an effort in recent years to move
toward a more evidence-based version of rational basis review in economic
cases. In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on commercial
speech buttresses the case for permitting external investment. In a pair of
recent decisions, the Court has demonstrated an increased focus on the
public’s interest in obtaining free and unfettered information. The corporate
practice doctrine therefore presents an excellent test case for a more robust
review of professional regulation, whether under a rational basis standard or
under a more heightened level of scrutiny.
INTRODUCTION
The corporate practice doctrine prohibits outside investment in professional
services.1 It prevents nonlawyers from investing in the provision of legal
services and likewise prevents nondoctors from investing in the provision of
medical care.2 Prohibiting such investment protects the licensed professionals
against outside competition. But does the prohibition also protect the clients
and patients of those licensed professionals by raising the quality of
professional advice?
The quality argument rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that
outside investment reduces independence and therefore lowers the quality of
professional advice; and second, that getting bad professional advice is worse
than getting no professional advice at all. If either one of these assumptions
proves false, then the quality-based rationale for banning outside investment
crumbles, leaving only a protectionist rationale. Both assumptions have been
heavily criticized by scholars, policymakers, and others,3 and few onlookers
1

Grace M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 MO. L. REV. 151, 205 (2000).
2 Id. at 204-05; George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access
to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a
Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 800 (2001) (“By denying to non-lawyers
the opportunity to buy and resell the services of lawyers, granting to lawyers the exclusive
right to earn a profit from investment in the legal services industry, and denying to nonlawyers the opportunity to compete for management positions in for-profit law firms, the
ownership restriction serves to ‘keep the law business all in the family.’”).
3 See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 1, at 205 (“The Model Rules protect more directly against
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have attempted to defend the corporate practice doctrine on either normative or
pragmatic grounds.4
This Article examines why, in spite of such criticism, the doctrine still
remains alive in the twenty-first century, preventing the professions from
benefiting from outside investment, and why it is now more important than
ever to allow private ordering in the market for professional services.5 In
particular, this Article argues that current trends in technology, information
availability, and globalization counter the existence of even a hypothetical
benefit from the doctrine.6 This Article then turns to the question of how to
eradicate the doctrine – an issue not easily solved, as the doctrine is embedded
in competing statutory and common law sources, as well as in the ethical rules
governing the legal profession.7 Economic protectionism, misguided

the evils feared if corporations can practice law via attorneys than does the ‘hocus pocus’ of
the corporate practice of law doctrine.”); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting
Access to Justice Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333990 (“[A]s
a matter of economic policy, it is essential that the legal profession abandon the prohibition
on the corporate practice of law.”); Harris & Foran, supra note 2, at 800; Nicole Huberfeld,
Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine,
14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 244 (2004) (“The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a relic;
a physician-centric guild doctrine that is at best misplaced, and at worst obstructive, in the
present incarnation of the American health care system.”); Renee Newman Knake,
Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (arguing that bar
regulators disregard the potential benefit of corporate legal practice in the interests of lawyer
independence, reputation, and client security, while also ignoring the other mechanisms that
provide protection for those concerns).
4 Two articles have defended corporate practice restrictions in law. See Paul R. Koppel,
Under Siege from Within and Without: Why Model Rule 5.4 Is Vital to the Continued
Existence of the American Legal Profession, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 687, 698 (2001) (“At
heart, Model Rule 5.4 serves to protect clients from individuals not qualified or licensed to
practice law. The practice of law is an extremely specialized vocation requiring
particularized skills, professional ethics, and an independence of judgment. All these
prerequisites are needed to ensure that clients receive the best legal representation
possible.”); L. Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms That Practice Law Only: Society’s
Need, the Legal Profession’s Responsibility, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 262 (1990) (“We should
be seriously concerned about the pending proposals by some lawyers and accountants in this
country, and by the advocates of multidisciplinary practices in Europe, to dilute or even
abandon professional independence.”). Another article recommends strengthening the
restrictions in medicine as a means of reducing conflicts of interest between insurers and
medical professionals. Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate
Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 492 (1998)
(arguing for the resurrection of the corporate practice doctrine in medicine).
5 See infra Parts I & II.
6 See infra Part III.
7 See infra Part IV.

182

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:179

paternalism, and bureaucratic inertia all combine to resist easily abandoning
the corporate practice doctrine.
This Article therefore recommends cutting off the prohibition on outside
investment at the root by launching a constitutional challenge founded on due
process and freedom of contract.8 The constitutional case in favor of private
ordering is not an easy one to make.9 Current constitutional doctrine defers
heavily to state choices in the economic sphere, even when those choices lack
any empirical evidence of rationality.10 Nonetheless, the pendulum may now
be swinging back from its outer limit; commenters have urged courts to apply
“a somewhat more vigorous version of rationality review in economic cases,”
and there are signs that some are willing to do so, though such efforts remain
controversial.11 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on
commercial speech may buttress the challenge to the prohibition on outside
investment. In recent years, the Court has been increasingly willing to
recognize the public’s interest in free and unfettered information.12 The
corporate practice doctrine therefore presents an excellent test case for a more
robust review, whether under a rational basis standard or under a more
heightened level of scrutiny, that defers to legitimate economic choices but

8

See infra Part IV.
Judge Stephen Williams has persuasively argued that the structure of the Constitution
“express[es] a preference for minimizing state interferences in private ordering,” and that a
preference for private ordering can usefully play a “tie-breaker role” in statutory
interpretation. Stephen F. Williams, Background Norms in the Regulatory State, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 419, 433-34 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)).
10 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (providing that
deference to state legislative choice is appropriate whenever “there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it”); see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 2 (2011) (“The Supreme Court
withdrew constitutional protection for liberty of contract in the 1930s. Since then, a hostile
perspective inherited from the Progressives has virtually monopolized scholarly discussion
of the Court’s liberty of contract decisions.”).
11 Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and the End of the Constitutional Double
Standard, 36 VT. L. REV. 903, 928-29 (2012) (describing how others that have pressed for
the more vigorous review, but expressing personal nervousness about reviving Lochner); see
also BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 125 (“The Progressive outlook on constitutional law and
related matters—a combination of support for the growth of an administrative state
dominated by experts insulated from both politics and the market, opposition to serious
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, and indifference or hostility to
‘individualistic’ civil liberties and the rights of minorities—is now anachronistic and finds
no comfortable ideological home in modern American politics.”); Timothy Sandefur,
Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday’s Rationality Review Isn’t
Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457, 458 (2004).
12 See infra Part IV.B.
9
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does not blindly give way to policies designed to “protect[] insiders against
competition.”13
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE DOCTRINE

The corporate practice doctrine is a pure restriction on the right to contract:
it prohibits professionals from contracting for employment with entities
organized to serve third parties, and prohibits nonprofessionals from
contracting to provide capital in professional service firms.14 The doctrine took
root in the early part of the twentieth century, at a time when both the legal and
medical professions were struggling to distinguish themselves from the “spirit
of trade,”15 and desired to reduce competition among members of the
profession.16 Occupational licensing became widespread between 1890 and
1910.17 With a licensing scheme firmly in place, states then applied the
corporate practice doctrine primarily in medicine and law: doctors, dentists,
veterinarians, and lawyers have all been subject to the doctrine, and therefore
forbidden to practice in corporations with outside ownership or with partners
who were not also members of the same profession.18
The corporate practice doctrine rests on two primary grounds. The first is
pure economic protectionism: avoiding competition and keeping economic
returns for professionals alone.19 The second ground is oriented, at least in
13

Sandefur, supra note 11, at 487.
Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 45) (“The doctrine . . . prohibits lawyers from
being employed by entities that provide legal services to others: this is a restriction on the
form of contract that a lawyer can enter into with others.”).
15 Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 898 (1979) (quoting an unnamed 1890 report to the
AMA House of Delegates); see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice
of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 445, 461 (1987) (“In 1934 the House of Delegates added another ethical provision
bearing on contract practice. Entitled ‘Direct Profits to Lay Groups,’ the provision
condemned arrangements in which a lay entity directly profited from compensation received
by a physician for providing medical services.”).
16 See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 15, at 455 (“A substantial segment of the medical
profession harbored hostility toward forms of organizing medical practices and methods of
paying for medical services that increased competition among independent physicians.”);
Heather A. Miller, Note, Don’t Just Check “Yes” or “No”: The Need for Broader
Consideration of Outside Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (2010).
17 Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910:
A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 489 (1965) (“Laws to license doctors,
plumbers, barbers, funeral directors, nurses, electricians, horseshoers, dentists, and the
practitioners of many other occupations were debated, propounded and very often passed.”).
18 See, e.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Minn.
2005) (“[H]istorically the prohibition on corporate practice applies to the ‘learned
professions’ and is not limited to medicine.”).
19 Opposition to corporate practice arose in part because doctors “wanted to prevent the
emergence of any intermediary or third party that might keep for itself the profits potentially
14
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theory, toward client protection: defending professionals’ independent
judgment from outside pressure, and thereby protecting clients and patients
from the risk of harmful legal or medical advice.20 This Part explores how
those competing goals gave rise to the doctrine and how the doctrine
subsequently evolved over time in medicine and law.
A.

Medicine

The corporate practice doctrine is in some ways a historical anachronism in
the medical field – but it is nonetheless surprisingly resilient.21 The doctrine
arose in the states as part of a broader attempt to regulate professional
services.22 In 1934 the American Medical Association (AMA) added an ethical
rule declaring it “unprofessional” for doctors to contract for salaried
employment.23 The AMA declared that such practice “is beneath the dignity of
professional practice, is unfair competition with the profession at large, is
harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare of the people, and
is against sound public policy.”24
The corporate practice doctrine gained legitimacy after it survived a
constitutional challenge in the 1930s. The case challenging the doctrine arose
when a dentist’s license was revoked by the State of Colorado for accepting
employment with a corporate dental practice.25 The dentist appealed the

available in the practice of medicine. . . . [T]he full return on physicians’ labor had to go to
physicians.” PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 215-16
(1982)); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 15, at 455 (describing the medical profession’s
hostility towards not only corporate practice, but also contract practice, clinics, and group
practice).
20 E.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 194, 199 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the doctrine was “adopted to protect the professional
independence of physicians and to avoid the divided loyalty inherent in the relationship of a
physician employee to a lay employer”).
21 Andrew Fichter, Owning a Piece of the Doc: State Law Restraints on Lay Ownership
of Healthcare Enterprises, 39 J. HEALTH L. 1, 7 (2006) (“[T]he corporate practice doctrine
and related impediments to lay ownership have proven remarkably resilient.”).
22 See Friedman, supra note 17, at 489 (stating that professional regulation became
widespread between 1890 and 1910).
23
Am. Med. Ass’n., 94 F.T.C. 701, 899 (1979) (“It is unprofessional for a physician to
dispose of his professional attainments or services to any lay body, organization, group or
individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under terms or conditions
which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary or compensation received to accrue to the
lay body or individual employing him.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medical
Ethics and New Methods of Practice, 103 JAMA 263, 263-64 (1934))).
24 Id.
25 State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Miller, 8 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Colo. 1932), appeal
denied, Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563 (1932) (holding that
revoking a dentist’s license for accepting employment in a corporate practice was not an
abuse of discretion and was supported by the evidence).
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revocation on due process grounds, but the Supreme Court disagreed that the
doctrine raised a constitutional issue and therefore denied the appeal.26 Three
years later, the Court stated explicitly that states could reasonably prohibit
professionals from accepting employment in corporate practices.27 Perhaps not
coincidentally, the Court’s decision to uphold the corporate practice doctrine
went along with upholding prohibitions on advertising for professional
services,28 and it occurred just as the Court was more generally abandoning the
liberty of contract doctrine.29
Over the next eight decades, the corporate practice doctrine weakened in the
medical field. In 1979, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an
antitrust challenge to the AMA’s ethical rule against corporate practice.30 The
FTC ordered the association “to cease and desist from promulgating,
implementing and enforcing restraints on advertising, solicitation and contract
practices by physicians and on the contractual arrangements between
physicians and non-physicians,” though it made an exception to allow the
restraint of “false or deceptive” activities.31 The order was appealed;
ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
that the provision was an unlawful restraint of trade, and it upheld a modified
version of the order, requiring the Association to refrain from “interfering with
the consideration offered or provided to any physician in any contract with any
entity that offers physicians’ services to the public.”32 The Second Circuit’s
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court in 1982.33
The elimination of the AMA’s previous restriction did not mean the end of
the corporate practice doctrine in medicine, though it may have looked that
way in the early 1980s.34 Nevertheless, a number of states still independently
prohibited physicians from contracting for employment with for-profit
26

Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563 (1932) (denying appeal
for want of a federal question).
27 Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935) (“We have held
that the State may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the personal
obligations of individuals . . . .”) (citing Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 8 P.2d 699,
appeal denied, Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563).
28 Semler, 294 U.S. at 611-12 (“We do not doubt the authority of the State to estimate the
baleful effects of such [advertising] methods and to put a stop to them.”).
29 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 108 (“[T]he Court’s abandonment of the liberty of
contract doctrine b[egan] in the mid-1930s.”).
30 Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 453 (excepting from the provision “professional peer review of fee practices of
physicians”).
33 Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
34 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Has Its Time
Passed?, 12 HEALTH L. DIG. 1, 3-4 (Supp. Dec. 1984) (calling corporate practice restrictions
“‘legal landmines,’ remnants of an old and nearly forgotten war, half-buried on a field fast
being built up with new forms of health care organizations”).
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corporations.35 Because these rules were adopted by state legislatures, they
were exempt from antitrust challenges under the state action doctrine.36 Some
state laws were preempted by federal legislation authorizing health
management organizations (HMOs).37 Other state laws remained on the books,
though largely ignored and unenforced for a number of years.38 Nevertheless, a
significant minority of states continued actively enforcing corporate practice
restrictions,39 and, in recent years, some states have begun dusting off longignored common law restrictions on corporate practice.40 In addition, the

35

Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Minn. 2005); D.
Cameron Dobbins, Survey of State Laws Relating to the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 9
HEALTH LAW. 18, 18 (1996).
36 Cal. Ass’n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting Pearle Vision Center’s antitrust challenge to California’s
corporate practice restriction, as the regulations “are activities required by the state acting in
its sovereign capacity,” and therefore “beyond the reach of the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws”).
37 Sabra K. Engelbrecht, Comment, The Importance of Clarifying North Carolina’s
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1093, 1102-03 (1998)
(“Although the 1973 legislation did not explicitly preempt state corporate practice of
medicine prohibitions, 1988 amendments to the HMO Act preempted all state laws that
impose requirements that inhibit the formation of HMOs. . . . Accordingly, almost all of the
states have exempted HMOs from the prohibition against the corporate practice of
medicine.” (footnotes omitted)).
38 Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The
Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 47 (1996) (“While the majority of
states retain a bar on the corporate practice of medicine, corporate interests have managed to
either find a way around, through, or ignored the intent behind the corporate bar.” (footnote
omitted)); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1165, 1166 n.2 (2012) (“By the end of the century, most states were
ignoring the laws, had repealed them, or had enacted laws enabling managed care plans to
structure themselves as corporations. The advent of large private and governmental health
insurance programs and their attempts to rein in costs ultimately defeated efforts by
organized medicine to resist external controls over physician behavior.” (citations omitted)).
39 One recent study found that ten states actively enforced a prohibition on doctors from
accepting direct employment with for-profit hospitals as of 2012; four of those ten states
also restricted employment by nonprofit hospitals. Eric Lammers, The Effect of HospitalPhysician Integration on Health Information Technology Adoption, 22 HEALTH ECON. 1215,
1218 (2013) (showing that Arkansas, California, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia are the states that limit employment
with hospitals in some manner).
40 Isles Wellness, 703 N.W.2d at 524 (reaffirming a 1933 case, Granger v. Adson, 250
N.W. 722 (Minn. 1933), adopting a common law prohibition on the corporate practice of
medicine); Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 253 (“While the doctrine may seem too outdated to
be enforced, the statutes and regulations that form the doctrine remain in current statutory
compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight stimulus to be set into action.”).
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passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act reignited the
discussion of corporate practice restrictions.41
B.

Law

The corporate practice doctrine has remained much more robust in law than
in medicine. The legal profession originally followed a similar path as the
medical profession, by first introducing licensing rules and then by restricting
licensed professionals’ ability to contract for employment with corporate
entities. The American Bar Association (ABA), like the AMA, was
instrumental in adding corporate practice restrictions to the ethics rules: the
ABA adopted supplemental ethical rules against nonlawyer investment in law
firms in 1928,42 very close to the time that the AMA adopted its parallel rules
for doctors.43 These supplemental ethics canons provided that the “professional
services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer” and further
specified that a lawyer who works in-house with a business or organization
“should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an
organization in respect to their individual affairs.”44 The supplemental canons
even prohibited attorneys from serving as advice columnists for newspapers,
specifically stating that while a “lawyer may with propriety write articles for
publications in which he gives information upon the law,” that attorney
“should not accept employment from such publications to advise inquirers in
respect to their individual rights.”45

41 See Craig A. Conway, Accountable Care Organizations Versus Texas’ Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine, HEALTH L. PERSP. 3-5 (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.law.uh.
edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2010/%28CC%29%20ACO.pdf (observing that the Act’s
establishment of “Accountable Care Organizations” would likely conflict with Texas’s
statutory prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine, and suggesting that the state
statute be amended to accommodate the new practice form (but cautioning that physicians
may be unwilling to accept the lower billing rates and heightened control offered by such
organizations)).
42 Report, Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional Ethics, 51
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 495, 497 (1928) (“The professional services of a lawyer should not be
controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer.”); Striking and Successful Celebration of Association’s Semi-Centennial,
14 A.B.A. J. 447, 479-80 (1928) (observing that the proposals were officially adopted in at
the ABA annual meeting in 1928); Bernard Sharfman, Note, Modifying Model Rule 5.4 to
Allow for Minority Ownership of Law Firms by Nonlawyers, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477,
480 (2000).
43 Medical Ethics and New Methods of Practice, 103 JAMA 263, 263-64 (1934).
44 Report, supra note 42, at 497 (“The professional services of a lawyer should not be
controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer.”).
45 Id.
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These restrictions on attorney employment paralleled the restrictions on
physician employment.46 Unlike the AMA, however, the ABA did not regulate
lawyers’ conduct directly; instead, the highest court of each state was charged
with adopting ethical rules to govern the practice of law, though in actual
practice those rules tended to largely mirror the ABA’s model.47 The
difference in adoption procedures meant that the state action exception to
antitrust liability played a more robust role. The FTC did challenge certain
ABA restrictions, including an overbroad definition of the “practice of law.”48
Such challenges were ultimately left to the individual states, however, and
there was no effective analog in the legal profession to the FTC’s challenge to
the AMA rule – although the FTC did urge states to drop the corporate practice
restrictions, it had no power to compel that action.49 As a result, while the
AMA dropped its ethical restriction on corporate practice after losing the
FTC’s 1979 lawsuit, the ABA did not drop its rule; in fact, its restriction on
nonlawyer investment remains part of the current ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.50

46

See supra Part I.A.
Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 620-21 (1989) (“The state action
exemption has been held to shelter lawyer rules of professional conduct when they have
been adopted by a state supreme court. Thus, state court action adopting Rule 5.4, or its
predecessors under the older Code, would be immune from prosecution or private action
under the antitrust laws.” (footnote omitted)); James Wilber, Ready or Not, Here They
Come, LEGAL MGMT., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 16, 16 (“Most states now have rules of
professional conduct that closely mirror the ABA’s model rules . . . .”).
48 Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1707-08
(2008) (“After being told by the FTC, the Department of Justice, and its own section on
Antitrust Law that the definition was too broad, the task force recommended and the ABA
adopted a resolution that allowed an arguably broader definition but left the matter to the
profession in each state.” (footnote omitted)).
49 Andrews, supra note 47, at 620 (“[W]hile the existing rules governing the relations
between lawyers and nonlawyers are incompatible with federal antitrust policy, they have
escaped enforcement because of the state action defense.”); Harris & Foran, supra note 2, at
800 (observing that the FTC urged the Supreme Court of Kentucky not to adopt a rule
against outside investment, as it would “prevent the use of potentially efficient business
formats” and otherwise “limit potentially procompetitive professional ventures” (citing
Letter from Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Dir., FTC Bureau of Competition, to Robert F. Stephen,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ky. 5-6 (June 8, 1987))).
50 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d) (2010) (forbidding a lawyer from
“practic[ing] with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to
practice law for a profit,” if, among other things, “a nonlawyer owns any interest therein”);
id. cmt. 2 (stating that the rule “expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party
to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal services to
another”).
47
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The states have likewise been reluctant to abandon the corporate practice
doctrine for legal services. In 1981, an ABA commission (chaired by attorney
Robert Kutak, and formed for the purpose of recommending revisions to the
Model Rules) returned a recommendation in favor of allowing nonlawyer
investment in legal services, as long as other requisites of independence and
confidentiality were maintained.51 The proposal died after opponents pointed
out that “the proposed rule would open up the legal profession to ownership by
large retail institutions such as Sears or the large accounting firms, creating
competition with traditional law firms”; afterward, these objections to
nonlawyer investment became known as the “Fear of Sears,” and were
influential in defeating the proposal.52
Although states need not follow the ABA Model Rules, there have been few
state initiatives to change the rules on nonlawyer investment. The District of
Columbia has the most generous investment provision of any U.S. jurisdiction;
it allows “an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which
assist the organization in providing legal services to clients” to become a
partner in a firm that “has as its sole purpose providing legal services to
clients” as long as the nonlawyer participant(s) “undertake to abide by these
Rules of Professional Conduct.”53 This limited exception would allow an
accountant to become a partner at a tax law firm; it would not, however, allow
Sears or WalMart to hire attorneys to provide legal services to store customers,
and it would not allow the passive contribution of capital from outside
investors.54 In 2011, both the ABA and the State of New York examined
proposals to adopt limited rules similar to the D.C. rule;55 due to opposition
from the bar, however, both proposals went down in defeat.56
51

Sharfman, supra note 42, at 481 (“The Commission’s 1981 draft of Model Rule 5.4
recommended that investment by nonlawyers be permitted so long as there was no
interference with the lawyer’s professional independent judgment and attorney-client
relationship, the rule on confidentiality of information was retained, the rules on solicitation
were not violated, and the fees charged were reasonable.”).
52 Id. at 481; see also Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998)
(“For nearly seventy years, the profession’s Fear of Sears has doomed any proposal that
would have allowed a nonlawyer even a passive investment in a law firm.”).
53 D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2007).
54 Id. cmt. 8.
55 Tyler Cobb, Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately Harnessing the
Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 787 (2012).
56 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP 5054 (2012); Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2) (observing that the ABA 20/20 proposal
“was killed by the Commission four months after the circulation of a discussion draft, never
making it to the floor of the House of Delegates,” and the New York State Bar “released a
report explaining their opposition to the proposal”); Press Release, ABA Comm’n on Ethics
20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy
Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.americanbar.

190

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:179

In spite of the fact that the ABA and the states have been reluctant to change
the investment rules, they may well find change foisted upon them. Other
countries – most notably Australia and England – have liberalized their
investment rules and allowed outside investment.57 As discussed more in Part
III, U.S. jurisdictions are facing significant competitive pressure on the
international front from jurisdictions that have already liberalized restrictions
on professional practice.58
In addition to pressure from these international sources, domestic legal
service providers (though still a minority of the practicing bar)59 are also
pressing for change, and new lawsuits are challenging the investment
restrictions. An earlier constitutional challenge to the rules against outside
investment was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in 1992.60 Now, however, the
challenges are revitalized. The law firm of Jacoby and Meyers, LLP has been
at the vanguard of the new challenges to the corporate practice doctrine within
the United States; it has sued in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut,
arguing that the ban on investment violates the firm’s constitutional rights.61
These suits are still in their infancy, with the underlying substantive legal
arguments yet to be fleshed out.62 Nevertheless, the suits may well have
traction; after a federal district court in New York originally dismissed the
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120416_news_release_re_nonlawyer_o
wnership_law_firms.authcheckdam.pdf.
57 See infra Part III.B.
58 Daniel Vázquez Albert, Competition Law and Professional Practice, 11 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 555, 617-18 (2005) (“This circumstance has turned the countries with flexible
regulations into exporters of professional services and those with rigorous regulations into
importers of such services.”); Justin D. Petzold, Comment, Firm Offers: Are Publicly
Traded Law Firms Abroad Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 67, 101 (“Motivation for reform via competitive pressure in the United States
must emerge via an international front.”).
59 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3-4) (commenting that state bars
overwhelmingly supported maintaining corporate practice restrictions).
60 Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1385 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the
rule against outside investment satisfied rational basis review because it is “designed to
safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration
of justice from reproach”).
61 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Jacoby & Meyers,
LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third & Fourth Departments, Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, No. CV-11-3387 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 2011
WL 7102185 (“Rule 5.4 substantially burdens the fundamental right of legal service
providers to associate with others and to represent clients for purposes of accessing the
courts and asserting legal entitlements. There are no compelling or rational grounds for
preventing lawyers from raising capital in the same manner as any other business; and there
are alternative regulatory means to achieve any putative legitimate state purposes that Rule
5.4 otherwise seeks to advance.”); Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 18).
62 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 18) (stating that the New Jersey and Connecticut
courts have yet to rule on the merits).
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New York case for lack of standing, the Second Circuit reinstated the case and
remanded for consideration on the merits.63
C.

The Continuing Challenge of Corporate Practice Restrictions in Medicine
and Law

As discussed previously, the corporate practice doctrine has eroded more
quickly in medicine than in law. In some states, corporate practice restrictions
have been eliminated from the medical field entirely – a situation still unheard
of in the legal field.64 And even in states that continue to restrict the corporate
practice of medicine, significant loopholes to the doctrine allow greater
participation by organizations – in many states, for example, hospitals and their
affiliates are allowed to employ physicians.65 Other states will allow a broader
range of business entities to employ physicians, as long as “the company does
not exercise control over the physician’s independent medical judgment.”66
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that the doctrine is necessarily on the
way out in medicine; while some states have continued to loosen restrictions,
others have reaffirmed or tightened existing restrictions.67

63 Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third & Fourth
Departments, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 488 F.
App’x 526, 527 (2d Cir. 2012) (remanding to allow Jacoby & Meyers, LLP to amend its
complaint to challenge additional New York state laws so that the District Court could
adequately address the constitutionality of those laws and Rule 5.4).
64 Lofft et al., Is a Hybrid Just What the Doctor Ordered? Evaluating the Potential Use
of Alternative Company Structures by Healthcare Enterprises, HEALTH LAW., Apr. 2013, at
9, 13 (“Some states have not historically prohibited CPOM, and a few have not provided
meaningful guidance as to whether CPOM is prohibited (and whether any exceptions
apply).” (footnote omitted)); see also 1992 Va. Op. Att’y Gen. 147, 150 (1992) (“[T]here is
no court decision or statute in Virginia adopting the ‘corporate practice of medicine’
doctrine.”); Health Care Alert: State Medical Board of Ohio Declares that Ohio Law Does
Not Prohibit the Corporate Practice of Medicine, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR & PEASE LLP
(Apr. 4, 2012), www.vorys.com/publications-589.html (“Ohio law does not prohibit an Ohio
licensed physician from rendering medical services as an employee of a corporation or any
other form of business entity.”).
65 Lofft et al., supra note 64, at 13.
66 Id. at 13 n.20 (citing 2001 Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 89; Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 91-7-1
(1991)).
67 Id. at 13 (“A small number of states have in recent years reaffirmed their commitment
to the CPOM doctrine.”); see also Estate of Harper ex rel. Al-Hamim v. Denver Health &
Hosp. Auth., 140 P.3d 273, 276 (Colo. App. 2006) (acknowledging that the Colorado
legislature took action “to reinstate the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to the extent
[a 2002 court decision] had created an exception to it”); Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive
N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn. 2005) (reaffirming restrictions on the corporate
practice of medicine).
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Thus, although state laws vary significantly, industry advisors point to four
areas in which the corporate practice doctrine continues to exert influence over
the medical profession:
1. Some states prohibit business entities from employing physicians to
provide medical care.
2. Certain states require entities that provide medical services be owned
and operated by licensed medical doctors.
3. Some states prohibit professional fee splitting between licensed
medical professionals and non-licensed individuals or business entities.
4. The management fees stated within management services agreements
must be set at fair market value.68
By and large, these restrictions are the same as the prohibitions on lawyers’
practice found in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.69 The first
three restrictions are explicitly forbidden,70 and the fourth is normally
inapplicable only because law firms, unlike medical providers, rarely hire
outside administrators – though parallel restrictions on marking up fees for
nonlegal services would almost certainly require firms to limit such fees to fair
market value if they did hire such administrators.71
Thus, the types of restrictions imposed by the corporate practice doctrine are
strikingly similar in both law and medicine. The main difference is that these
restrictions are more universal in law than in medicine. States have enacted a
patchwork of exceptions and loopholes in the corporate practice of medicine,
so that while each of these restrictions continues to carry force in some states,
the doctrine does not operate consistently – in the field of medicine, different
states impose different restrictions to different degrees. In law, however, the
states are nearly uniform, with only the District of Columbia having allowed
minor inroads into outside investment.72 Nevertheless, because the doctrine
operates similarly across the two professions, it is useful to consider the

68 Jennifer Brunkow, 3 Steps to Navigate Through the Corporate Practice of Medicine,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legalregulatory-issues/3-steps-to-navigate-through-the-corporate-practice-of-medicine.html.
69 See supra Part I.B.
70 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).
71 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993)
(finding that attorneys are limited to charging “reasonable fees” for administrative services
and that unless the client has agreed otherwise, “it is impermissible for a lawyer to create an
additional source of profit for the law firm beyond that which is contained in the provision
of professional services themselves”); Douglas R. Richmond, The Business and Ethics of
Liability Insurers’ Efforts to Manage Legal Care, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 57, 68 (1997) (“As a
general rule, attorneys should bear overhead costs rather than shifting them to their
clients.”).
72 See supra notes 53-56.
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professions together when examining the role of corporate practice restrictions
in the modern era.
II. THE CORPORATE PRACTICE DOCTRINE’S REGULATORY DISTORTION
Regulation is intended to counteract market failure.73 Thus, economic
regulation may be aimed at removing monopoly rents when competition is
absent from the marketplace.74 Regulation of professional services, by contrast,
is intended – at least in theory75 – to compensate for market failure arising
from consumers’ inability to monitor professional quality: if laypeople cannot
competently evaluate the quality of professional service providers they hire,76
then regulation may protect the public from suffering harm they could not have
reasonably avoided.77
But while regulation at its best can correct for market failure, at its worst it
can also induce the very market failure that it was intended to counteract.78
Such regulatory distortion can occur when individuals capture the regulatory
system and introduce anticompetitive rules for their own benefit.79 Regulatory
73

Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing out the Bathwater: Justice
Breyer’s Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 721, 725 (1995) (“According to
economic theory, the purpose of regulation is to address market failures and thereby
increase the efficiency of markets.” (citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
(1982))).
74 See James Alleman & Paul Rapport, Optimal Pricing with Sunk Cost and Uncertainty,
in THE ECONOMICS OF ONLINE MARKETS AND ICT NETWORKS 143, 146 (Russel Cooper et al.
eds., 2006).
75 In practice, licensing laws have often served to extract monopoly rents. David E.
Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government Regulatory
Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90 (1994); Thomas G. Moore,
The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93, 93 (1961).
76 Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1329 (1979) (“It is difficult, for example, for a patient to
ascertain the exact quality of a physician’s services or for a housewife (or househusband) to
verify the radiation leakage of a microwave oven.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big
Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 806 (commenting that licensing schemes “assume a need to
screen unqualified lawyers in order to prevent the development of a ‘lemons’ market in
which consumers do not know whom to trust and therefore distrust lawyers generally”).
77
Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 207 (Colo. 2006) (“The primary purpose of lawyer
regulation proceedings is to protect the public, not to punish an offending lawyer.”); Bird v.
Mo. Bd. of Architects, Prof’l Eng’rs, Prof’l Land Surveyors & Landscape Architects, 259
S.W.3d 516, 523 (Mo. 2008) (“While some financial protection of licensees may be an
effect of professional regulation, the public’s protection—not the licensees’—is the purpose
of professional regulation.”).
78 BREYER, supra note 73, at 194-95 (commenting that “classical regulation can cause
various sorts of anticompetitive harm,” including raising barriers to entry, raising prices, and
protecting inefficient firms).
79 Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
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distortion can also occur even with the best of intentions if regulators
misunderstand the relevant facts and circumstances underlying the regulated
system.80 In such cases, regulators may misdiagnose the market failure they
seek to correct, or they may correctly diagnose the problem but apply the
wrong set of tools to fix the problem.81
The corporate practice doctrine creates all three types of regulatory
distortion. On the legal side, there is no question that attorney self-regulation
gives rise to some amount of self-interested rulemaking – and that, in
particular, one of the motivations for preserving corporate practice restrictions
was to protect against competition.82 Likewise, physicians have rallied in favor
of the corporate practice doctrine in medicine.83 But the larger regulatory
distortions are the ones that are unintentional: Even if the doctrine were
adopted with the best of intentions for public protection, it would still reduce
access to medical and legal services without correspondingly increasing the
quality of professional care.
There is significant evidence that corporate practice restrictions reduce
access to professional services.84 This reduction is not surprising; prohibiting
outside investment in professional services denies professional service
providers the resources they need in order to find and serve their clientele.85
This effect is especially pronounced at the lower end of the market, where
outside investment could create economies of scale that would bring the cost of
professional services down to a level where more people could afford to enter
the market.86
1180 (2003) (“In general, small, concentrated groups with a lot at stake per capita regularly
triumph over diffuse, large groups with little individual stake, even though the aggregate
cost to the large group is considerable and often greater than the gain to the small group.”).
80 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 4-35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 530 (1945)
(discussing the economist’s error “to assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind
in the same manner in which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economist”).
81 BREYER, supra note 73, at 194 (discussing the importance of identifying “areas where
the wrong regulatory tools are likely being used”).
82 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3) (explaining how a New York proposal to
allow nonlawyer ownership of law firms failed after a survey of state lawyers encountered
seventy-eight percent opposition).
83 ALLEGRA KIM, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
DOCTRINE 1 (2007) (“With the aid of state legislatures and the courts, physicians seeking to
promote and protect their profession and autonomy succeeded in prohibiting the CPM.”).
84 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 1-2); Harris & Foran, supra note 2, at 800
(“The legal services regulatory scheme and its various prohibitions thus play a prominent
role in ensuring that the price of participation in the legal services market remains too high
for most Americans.”).
85 Hadfield, supra note 48, at 1723 (“Professional regulation of legal markets
significantly restricts the capacity for scaling up new legal ideas by limiting the potential to
exploit economies of scale and scope.”).
86 Id.; Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 5) (“The problem is not financing options
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The corporate form itself is valuable precisely for its ability to offer a choice
of raising capital either through debt financing or by offering ownership
shares.87 Like other entrepreneurs and innovators, professional service
providers need sufficient capital to be able to reach potential clients in need of
their services. And in fact, professional service providers may need more
capital than traditional businesses. There is no reason to believe that attorneys
and physicians are usually good – or even mediocre – businesspeople; these
are very different skill sets, and, as others have pointed out, “an inventive mind
is rarely accompanied by the skill necessary to transform a novel thought into
the tangible invention and produce it for the market.”88 Lawyers and doctors
have dedicated years of education to develop a very specialized expertise. Only
in rare instances, however, does their expertise encompass either marketing
skill or administrative ability. Capital – including economic, intellectual, and
social capital – is needed to bridge the gap between these professional service
providers and their markets.89
The inefficiencies created by the corporate practice doctrine can be easily
seen in the current market for legal services. The market currently contains
large numbers of unemployed attorneys willing to work for low pay90
coexisting with a large population of individuals who need, but cannot afford,
legal services.91 In an efficient market, the attorneys looking for work would
be hired by those who have unmet legal needs. Differences in price
requirements (what the client would be willing to pay, and what the attorney
would be willing to accept) are not the primary driver of inefficiency; in spite
of the fact that attorneys have been applying in droves for unpaid internships
and low-paying positions,92 a typical client cannot find an attorney willing to
available to existing law firms, which do indeed seem to be surviving just fine without
equity participation by nonlawyers.”).
87 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Selecting a Business Entity for a Small Business: Non-Tax
Considerations, 93 DICK. L. REV. 519, 539 (1989).
88 Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950).
89 Cassandra Burke Robertson, A Collaborative Model of Offshore Legal Outsourcing,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 149 (2011) (describing four forms of capital – economic, intellectual,
social, and symbolic – and observing that intellectual capital includes “specialized
knowledge and competence in the field,” and social capital includes “access to stakeholders
and decisionmakers”).
90 For example, a Boston firm offering $10,000 a year for a full-time attorney received
thirty-two applications for the job. Martha Neil, Boston Law Firm Got 32 Applicants for
Attorney Job Paying $10,000 a Year, Partner Says, A.B.A. J. (May 31, 2012, 4:35 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/boston_law_firm_got_32_applicants_for_attorney_
job_paying_10000_a_year_part.
91 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 10) (“Conventional legal services are simply
beyond the means of most Americans.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook
Disruption: How Social Media May Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to
Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 84 (2012).
92 Alana Semuels, Unpaid Internships Gain Popularity Among the Jobless, L.A. TIMES
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accept less than $150 an hour – a rate that is flatly unaffordable even for most
middle class individuals.93
Instead, the mismatch appears to arise from difficulties in maintaining
overhead, finding and reaching the potential client base, and adopting an
economy of scale sufficient to sustain the legal work – all things that are made
more difficult under the current regulatory regime.94 Thus, a single attorney
who “hangs a shingle” may have a difficult time making a living.95 The
attorney may not know how to market his or her services or how best to reach
those who might have unmet legal needs. Even if the attorney finds a paying
client or two, it is unlikely that the attorney has sufficient cash reserves to
cover the downtime between clients. The attorney, like any other entrepreneur,
needs sufficient capital to be able to reach potential clients in need of legal
services. Having sufficient capital also provides benefits to the clients – thus,
for example, many solo practitioners cannot afford malpractice insurance and
are largely judgment proof as individuals, creating a risk for clients.96
Allowing corporate entities to provide legal services largely eliminates that
risk, as such entities would have sufficient capital either to purchase insurance
or to self-insure.97
(Mar. 14, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/14/business/la-fi-old-interns-2011031
5; Liza Dee & Cory Weinberg, In Dim Job Market, Law School Pays More Graduates to
Work, GW HATCHET (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/07/in-dim-jobmarket-law-school-pays-more-graduates-to-work.
93 Robertson, supra note 91, at 79 (explaining that most parties without legal
representation in civil actions do not qualify for legal aid and “often cannot afford the cost
of an attorney, which would likely run $150 per hour or more”); Debra Cassens Weiss,
Middle-Class Dilemma: Can’t Afford Lawyers, Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid, A.B.A. J. (July
22, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/middle-class_dilemma_cant_
afford_lawyers_cant_qualify_for_legal_aid.
94 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 154 (2010)
(“[T]he extreme approach to unauthorized practice of law in the United States drastically
curtails the potential for ordinary folks to obtain assistance with their law-related needs and
problems.”).
95 See, e.g., Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a
Twentieth (Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 415, 482-83 (acknowledging that “solo and small firm lawyers” who lack the capital to
adjust to the changing legal market may be harmed by competition from corporate
competitors, but that “nonlawyer-corporate ownership will bring needed capital and
incentives to develop alternative and creative business models for delivering legal services
at prices much more in line with the financial realities of middle- and lower-income
clients”).
96 Steven K. Berenson, A Cloak for the Bare: In Support of Allowing Prospective
Malpractice Liability Waivers in Certain Pro Bono Cases, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 26 (2005)
(“[I]t seems probable that small firm and solo practitioners are more likely to ‘go bare,’ that
is, practice without malpractice insurance coverage, than their colleagues in larger firms.”).
97 Id. (“Medium- and large-size firms are more likely to have the resources necessary to
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Eliminating the corporate practice restrictions could help connect willing
buyers and willing sellers.98 An existing corporation might hire attorneys to
provide affordable legal services to individual clients; some have speculated
that WalMart could integrate legal services into store locations that already
offer banking and optometry services in many areas, or that Google could
expand its technological empire into computer-assisted legal services.99 In
medicine, where there has been a greater move away from corporate practice
restrictions, it has been easier to measure the doctrine’s effect on access to
care; experience has shown that allowing physicians to practice in “efficient
and economical” business forms improves access to medical care for
individuals, especially in rural or remote areas where the fixed costs of practice
may not allow a single doctor’s practice to scale to an efficient level.100
With regard to legal services in particular, some have questioned whether
there is truly an untapped market of people willing and able to pay for legal
services.101 It is certainly true that for the most destitute, lower prices may
matter less than access to publicly funded services (though there is still unmet
need even in the population currently eligible for subsidized services).102 For
obtain malpractice insurance coverage. On the other hand, a greater percentage of smallfirm and solo practitioners may lack the resources necessary to obtain adequate coverage.”).
98 Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical
View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 268 (1985) (“Salaried lawyers, often
younger ones, constitute another group who lose by virtue of rules like 5.4. Because only
other lawyers may hire them to provide legal services to third persons for a profit, the
number of these jobs will be limited by the number of lawyers willing to create them. If the
ban on lay participation were lifted, the number of these jobs likely would expand. Legal
time can be a remunerative product bought wholesale and sold retail.”).
99 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (“Corporations like Google and Wal-Mart know a great deal about the
delivery of services, goods, and information to the mass public. These corporations and
many others have the capacity to make significant financial outlays into innovative
mechanisms for providing legal services and await a delayed return on that investment.”).
100 Michele Gustavson & Nick Taylor, At Death’s Door – Idaho’s Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 518 (2011) (“Physicians especially have a
disincentive to practice in rural or remote areas, which inherently pose significant economic
risks due to their size and disadvantaged status. Corporations are more qualified to shoulder
the economic risks by hiring physicians full-time.”); Conway, supra note 41, at 3
(summarizing arguments “that the doctrine acts as a barrier to address the growing shortage
of physicians in rural areas of the state”).
101 Paul Campos, Law and Economics, LAW. GUNS & MONEY (Jan. 31, 2013), http://
www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/01/law-and-economics (“The reason ordinary folk
don’t pay for legal services even when in theory they could benefit from them is exactly the
same reason they don’t pay for a lot of things they could in theory benefit from: because
they don’t have any money for those things after paying for more pressing needs . . . .”).
102 Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social Contract: When Will the
United States Finally Guarantee Its People the Equality Before the Law the Social Contract
Demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 213 (2010) (“[T]he Medicaid budget provides over
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the middle class, however, affordability is essential to access103 – and at the
current time, the middle class is largely priced out of the traditional market.104
Additionally, the rapid growth and expansion of low-cost technological
alternatives like LegalZoom and LawPivot suggests that if the price of legal
services were lowered, demand would indeed increase.105 Thus, while lower
prices would not solve the access-to-justice problem alone, they would
nevertheless mitigate the problem, particularly for the middle class.106
III. THE CHANGING PROFESSIONAL LANDSCAPE
As the previous Section argues, the corporate practice doctrine significantly
limits access to professional advice by restricting the business forms in which
professionals may practice. Given the negative effect on access, any clientoriented defense of the doctrine must therefore rely on two premises: first, that
restricting access increases the quality of service rendered to those who remain
in the market for professional care, and second, that those who are priced out
of the market are better off with no access to professional service than they
would be with access to the lower-quality services they might receive in an
unrestricted professional marketplace.
Evidence from the states that have loosened restrictions on the corporate
practice of medicine suggests that the first premise is false.107 At least for
routine services, the evidence suggests that allowing doctors to contract for
employment with corporate entities increases access to care without
diminishing the quality of that care.108 A study of ophthalmologists found that
there was no difference in quality between corporate practices and physicianowned practices, but that restricting corporate practice raised prices by five to
thirteen percent.109 Another study of dentists found that corporate practices
actually provided higher levels of care for the most common services, though
the study concluded that these corporate practices were not as good at

$4,500 per eligible patient, while civil legal aid only has $20 per eligible client.”).
103 The Supreme Court made this point when it struck down attorney advertising
restrictions. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370 (1977) (“Studies reveal that many
persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of
services or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney.”).
104 Robertson, supra note 91, at 78-80 (discussing how less than half of middle-class
families with legal needs can afford to go to court and hire legal representation); Hadfield,
supra note 3 (manuscript at 10) (“Conventional legal services are simply beyond the means
of most Americans.”).
105 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 22-23).
106 See Robertson, supra note 91, at 79.
107 KIM, supra note 83, at 22-23 (describing studies that reveal “no statistically
significant relationship between commercial practice restrictions and higher quality”
medical treatment).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 22.
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providing complex services such as dental surgery.110 Thus, both cost and
quality are likely to be best served by eliminating restrictions on corporate
practice.111 Even if the benefits are limited to routine care, the overall effect
remains. Allowing outside investment would not eliminate traditional entities,
but would merely allow the creation of alternatives – so high-end boutique care
with professional ownership would still be available.112 In addition, new
businesses with a focus on expanded access and a possible emphasis on routine
care would be allowed to supplement the high-end care offered by the boutique
firms, thus increasing overall access to care.
The failure of the first premise – that corporate practice restrictions improve
the quality of service – should be enough by itself to support ending such
restrictions. After all, if allowing corporate practice reduces cost without
reducing quality, then there is no legitimate policy reason to keep the corporate
practice restrictions in place. Nevertheless, in case some are not convinced by
the available data on quality of service, it is worth examining the second
premise: Assuming that corporate practice restrictions did increase the quality
of service, what is the fate of those priced out of the market for professional
services – are they insulated from harmful or misleading guidance in the
medical or legal arena?
The answer to this question has changed over time, with both positive and
negative effects. In the past, regulators might have reasonably believed that the
public was better off with no care than with substandard care. Eighty years
ago, when these restrictions were first implemented, there was no evidence
contradicting that the view that information in the wrong hands could present a
danger to the public; and, without the ability to hire a professional, laypeople
were largely excluded from knowledge about legal and medical matters.113 In
110

Id. at 22-23 (“An unpublished FTC study found commercial dentistry practices (i.e.,
practices that employ at least one non-owner dentist, have at least three offices, and
advertise) provided higher quality for most common services but lower quality for complex
services, such as surgery.”).
111 See id.
112 Jurisdictions that have permitted outside investment have seen some, but not all, firms
choose to restructure. See Chris Johnson, Continental Breakfast: Three U.K. Firms Ink
External Investment Deals as Legal Services Shakeup Starts, AM. LAW. (Feb. 10, 2012,
12:05 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/02/ukexternalinvestmentdeals.
html (stating that in England, “[a] select group of U.K. top 100 firms have publicly
announced plans to convert to the new structure,” but that “major international and elite
corporate law firms are less likely to turn to external capital – at least in the near future”).
113 Silver v. Lansburgh & Bro., 111 F.2d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (observing that
previous cases had distinguished professions that were prohibited from engaging in
corporate practice from trades that did not require such protection “mainly upon the
difference in the required degree of learning and training,” but concluding that the private
nature and confidential communications required for medical and legal advice offered an
even sounder rationale for the prohibition, as “[t]hese necessary disclosures create the
personal relationship which cannot exist between patient or client and a profit-seeking
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the modern era, that belief is no longer reasonable. The growth of technology
and the globalization of everyday life mean that individuals have greater access
than ever before to information that was previously the exclusive domain of
licensed professionals.114 To the extent that modern communication technology
enables the public to provide adequate self-care even if priced out of the
market for professional services, this is a net positive benefit to society. To the
extent that such technology exposes individuals to harmful or misleading
advice, the effect may be negative. In both cases, however, the development of
this communications technology diminishes the argument in favor of
restricting professional services: in the modern era, any attempt to insulate
laypeople from specialized knowledge is doomed to failure.
A.

The Internet and Social Media

In the past, a person who could not afford to seek legal or medical advice
was faced with few resources. Self-study (in medicine) or self-representation
(in law) offered one option; seeking advice from friends or family members
offered another. Neither of these options, however, operated as a reasonable
substitute for professional advice; after all, doctors and lawyers have years of
specialized education and training, as well as a great deal of specialized
knowledge that would not be easy to replicate elsewhere. Thus, individuals
might well have sought help from nonprofessional sources, and might have
gotten good advice or bad advice from doing so. Nevertheless, the alternative
sources of information did not generally present a strong alternative to
professional care, and regulatory action combatting the unauthorized practice
of law and medicine ensured that these outsider sources of information
remained limited.115
The internet, however, is a game changer. The sheer quantity of information
available to an individual can come much closer to replicating the role of
professional advice; as a result, there is no doubt that modern technology
disrupts the current regulatory regime.116 Instead of seeking advice from a
corporation”).
114 Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and
Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 953, 1021-22 (2012) (“What is not wise is intransigence when the gap
between socially beneficial conduct and the rules that constrict the conduct grows large. We
have entered such a period for the rules governing the legal marketplace, and it is in large
part a product of changing technology and the cross-border activity of lawyers and
clients.”).
115 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers
to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 453 n.80 (1988) (noting that
courts have sustained “unauthorized practice of medicine” challenges in areas as diverse
faith healing, nutritional advice, and tattooing).
116 Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1577, 1651 (2007) (“The health care regulatory framework will and should
survive the health information revolution, but in altered form. . . . [I]t should prompt a shift
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single individual, the internet allows an individual to seek advice from the
“wisdom of the crowd.”117 In the aggregate, the collective knowledge even of
laypeople can be a reasonable substitute for the more specialized knowledge
possessed by an individual professional.118
In the medical realm, for example, a recent case study of parents who
searched “Doctor Google” for clues to their children’s illnesses found that the
parents were able to use the information gained from the internet to lead their
doctors to a correct diagnosis of their children’s rare disorders.119 The parents
were not medical specialists and were of merely “average education,” but by
searching their children’s symptoms, they were able to obtain an accurate
diagnosis.120 Internet search engines have also made it easier for people to selfdiagnose their own disorders correctly, especially in the case of minor
illnesses.121 If medical diagnosis presents a puzzle, the internet may allow
individuals to access enough disparate bits of information – symptoms, similar
cases histories, and related information – to allow even a layperson to put the
pieces together.122
Tapping into social connections through social media allows an individual
to combine data from professional and nonprofessional sources of
information.123 Thus, for example, a person going through a difficult divorce
away from market-displacing approaches toward the market-channeling and marketfacilitating regulatory approaches that can more easily accommodate variations in patient
preferences for the quality of care.”).
117 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 57 (2004).
118 Id. (explaining the value of collective wisdom and commenting that “[c]ollective
decisions are most likely to be good ones when they’re made by people with diverse
opinions reaching independent conclusions, relying primarily on their private information”).
119 Machtelt G. Bouwman et al., ‘Doctor Google’ Ending the Diagnostic Odyssey in
Lysosomal Storage Disorders: Parents Using Internet Search Engines as an Efficient
Diagnostic Strategy in Rare Diseases, 95 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 642, 643 (2010).
120 Id.
121 J. Escarrabill et al., Good Morning, Doctor Google, 17 REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE
PNEUMOLOGÍA 177, 179 (2011) (“Google is useful for patients to diagnose their own
complaints and, in some instances, they use it in a quicker and more effective manner than
the doctors, especially in cases of minor illnesses.”).
122 Databases of electronic health records can play a similar role in aggregating disparate
information, even substituting for clinical trials in some instances. See, e.g., Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in
Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 101 (2012) (“[O]bservational
studies have several advantages over clinical trials. EHR databases could allow researchers
to access vast amounts of information about patients with diverse demographics collected
over a much longer period of time than that encompassed by clinical trials, which typically
last only a few years.”).
123 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the
Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 151 (1999) (“In cyberspace, the much-decried unmet legal
needs of middle-income people are available for the world to see, with just a few clicks of a
mouse. The Internet abounds with tales of legal woe, presented through a number of
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who suspects that his lawyers are not diligently pursuing his interests in the
litigation might reach out to tap into the collective wisdom of his online social
network.124 Some of his Facebook friends may be lawyers, though perhaps in
different practice areas; other friends may have gone through acrimonious
divorces themselves, and may have experience with the legal process from the
client side. Those with experience in either realm “can give him a second
opinion on whether his concerns are warranted; they may post reassurances,
suggestions for other attorneys to hire, or even information about how to report
the attorneys for bar discipline.”125 Through this process, the individual can tap
into the aggregated collective wisdom of his social connections in a way that
would be difficult or even impossible to replicate in person, where he would
have to wade through numerous individual conversations in an effort to
determine who in his social circle could have relevant information.126
Other websites aggregate more specialized professional information, but do
so outside the traditional professional-layperson relationship. Two companies
in the legal services field, LawPivot127 and LegalZoom,128 maintain websites
where attorneys answer questions posed by persons without legal
representation. In contrast to traditional models of the attorney-client
relationship, the advice offered by such attorneys is not provided confidentially
to a single client; instead, it is archived on a public website, and intended to
provide assistance to future searchers with similar questions in addition to
helping the original poster who sought the advice.129 Similar websites allow
doctors to post medical advice on sites that serve both to offer individualized
advice and to archive that advice for future searches.130
Other websites may offer a forum for crowdsourced wisdom that does not
intentionally seek to enter the realm of professional advice, but finds instead
that medical and legal issues are not easily severable from the more general
issues that arise in everyday life. One of the best known sources of
crowdsourced wisdom is Ask Metafilter – the tagline for which is “querying
the hive mind” – a general advice site and offshoot of a popular community

different vehicles.”).
124 Robertson, supra note 91, at 84.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 LAWPIVOT, https://www.lawpivot.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
128 LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2013); see also
LegalZoom-Free Joe!, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/LegalZoom?sk=app_1053151
4314 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (providing a service on Facebook that allows users to
receive answers to their legal questions from an attorney by posting their questions to
LegalZoom’s Facebook page).
129 Robertson, supra note 91, at 84.
130 See, e.g., Randall Stross, Advice for the Ill, and Points for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2012, at BU3; HEALTHTAP, http://www.healthtap.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
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blog.131 The site routinely crowdsources general advice in questions that range
from attempts to identify dimly remembered childhood books,132 queries about
how to deal with roommates’ different religious beliefs,133 and requests for
advice about which investment fund to choose for retirement contributions.134
Some questions in the mix will seek advice in areas typically handled by
professionals; legal, medical, and tax advice are commonly sought.135 The
community – made up of both professionals and laypeople – has struggled with
the issue of how to handle such questions.136 Some have advocated a minimal
response suggesting only that the asker seek help from a licensed professional
– though even a suggestion to “go to the emergency room” is a type of medical
advice itself.137 Others, however, have been willing to provide more detailed
answers, often with the disclaimer IANAL (I Am Not A Lawyer) or
IAALBIANYL (I Am A Lawyer, But I Am Not Your Lawyer).138
Members of these online communities have expressed concern that offering
advice about professional matters can lead to problems, for the individuals who
may get bad advice and for the potential professional liability issues of those
who offer it.139 But in spite of these concerns, attempts to discourage such
131

Robertson, supra note 91, at 84.
What Children’s Book of Horror Stories Am I Trying to Remember?, ASK
METAFILTER (Feb. 15, 2013, 10:59 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/235380/What-childrensbook-of-horror-stories-am-I-trying-to-remember.
133 Jesus Says No!, ASK METAFILTER (Feb. 15, 2013, 8:39 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com
/235378/Jesus-says-no.
134 Help Me Choose Between 5 Vanguard Funds, ASK METAFILTER (Feb. 15, 2013, 8:04
PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/235377/Help-me-choose-between-5-Vanguard-Funds.
135 Policy Against Legal, Medical, and Tax Advice?, METATALK (Mar. 1, 2004, 8:34
AM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/5554/Policy-against-legal-medical-and-tax-advice.
136 Id. (“Requests for very specific legal, medical, and tax advice make me nervous.
There should be some policy against these, or at least a very bold warning strongly
discouraging and expressly disclaiming liability against responses in these threads.”).
137 Taz, Comment to Irresponsible Medical Advice and What to Do with It, METATALK
(Feb. 1, 2013, 9:58 PM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/22388 (“Medical questions are
always a bone of contention, but mostly people are pretty good about telling people to go to
the doctor / emergency room instead of relying on the advice of people who are not trained,
. . . I do think that it can be better for someone who doesn’t have access to medical care
because of lack of insurance or whatever to get a whole lot of comments saying ‘go ahead
and go to ER because this sounds bad,’ when that’s the case.”).
138 ClaudiaCenter, Comment to IAALBIANYL, METATALK (Dec. 21, 2007, 9:23 PM),
http://metatalk.metafilter.com/15513/IAALBIANYL (“I think it’s really important for
lawyers to provide access to legal information so that non-lawyers can assess their
situations. We [lawyers] often know very easily where is the relevant guidance, document,
statute, regulation to review, and just giving the lay of the land can be very useful to
people.”).
139 See, e.g., Irresponsible Medical Advice and What to Do with It, METATALK (Feb. 1,
2013, 9:58 PM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/22388; Policy Against Legal, Medical, and
Tax Advice?, METATALK (Mar. 1, 2004, 8:34 AM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/5554/
132
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advice have proven unsuccessful.140 As one scholar has noted about the online
discussion of legal problems, “what may be most surprising to the casual
observer is not that so many laypeople want legal advice to help them solve
their problems. Rather, it is that so many lawyers are apparently willing to
provide it.”141
But while professional liability or other sanctions are a theoretical
possibility for professional advice rendered without due care or full
information, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals may rightly perceive
their online discussions to be beyond the bounds of the state’s effective
regulatory power.142 Their advice may be rendered anonymously; it may cross
geographical borders; it may form only a small part of the advice given to a
particular individual, and therefore pose less of a risk of undue reliance.143
None of these factors necessarily insulates the professional from liability or
discipline, but those factors taken together may make such consequences
unlikely enough that the professionals do not feel the need to self-censor
online.144 As a result, the online marketplace for advice about medical and
legal matters remains robust, and regulatory attempts to limit or restrict
individuals’ exposure to risky information will be ineffective.145
Policy-against-legal-medical-and-tax-advice; see also Robertson, supra note 91, at 84-85.
140 See supra note 139.
141 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the
Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 156 (1999).
142 Robertson, supra note 91, at 86-87 (explaining that “limited-advice services like those
offered by LegalZoom may be vulnerable to challenge if the attorneys offering the advice
are not licensed in the client’s jurisdiction,” but that the online advice sites nevertheless
remain active and robust).
143 Id. (“The automated services are vulnerable to challenges by state unauthorizedpractice committees, however – and even semi-automated limited-advice services like those
offered by LegalZoom may be vulnerable to challenge if the attorneys offering the advice
are not licensed in the client’s jurisdiction.”).
144 See ClaudiaCenter, supra note 138 (explaining a lawyer’s belief in the importance of
open communication about legal information). Another poster to MetaTalk was similarly
straightforward about his or her profession:
[M]edical questions are not going away and I have no problem being public about my
profession. But these days I tend to limit my participation in threads to the very easily
answerable (what is this rash I took a picture of? Should I keep playing soccer when I
have this pain right here?) or to questions about navigating the medical system (what
questions should I ask my doctor before my gall bladder surgery? How can I find a
mental health doctor in Seattle without insurance?) and stay far away from anything
trickier (I’m peeing blood, what kind of cancer do I have?).
Slarty Bartfast, Comment to Irresponsible Medical Advice and What to Do with It,
METATALK (Feb. 2, 2013, 8:43 PM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/22388.
145 Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical
Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 438 (2007) (“Other than urging
‘surfer-beware’ and promoting information about high quality sites, there is little to be done
to protect American virtual tourists against the harm they might suffer from relying on either
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Globalization

While online sources of information may extend beyond the state’s
regulatory reach as a de facto matter, global professional service providers may
exceed the state’s regulatory power even de jure if there is no coordinated
international regime.146 For example, telemedicine allow doctors in one
country to treat patients in another.147 In addition, a growing number of
patients are engaging in “medical tourism” and traveling outside the United
States for more affordable medical procedures than the patients could obtain in
the United States.148 Because the foreign health care providers fall outside the
state’s regulatory reach, however, any attempt to discourage or limit such
medial tourism would require placing restrictions on the individuals who seek
such care, such as limiting their right to travel or placing criminal sanctions on
their pursuit of foreign medical treatment; and, even if such restrictions could
be constitutionally enacted, they would be nearly impossible to enforce.149
Legal services are even easier to outsource across borders – and
concomitantly harder to regulate – because most legal work can be done
remotely, with no need to travel.150 To the extent that U.S. lawyers are
involved in the outsourcing process, their actions will fall under their state’s

domestic or foreign Web content.”).
146 See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Structure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
431, 452 (2011) (“Globalization has produced an impact on the economy and society that is
equally as remarkable today as nationalization was more than a century ago. . . . As with
nationalization, effective solutions need to be global.”).
147 Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, The Constitutionality of Current Legal Barriers to
Telemedicine in the United States: Analysis and Future Directions of Its Relationship to
National and International Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 385, 442 (2011) (“The
cross-border nature of telemedicine involves opportunities and challenges, as the ability to
deliver health care across distances not only achieves public policy goals of greater quality
and access to health care, but also creates jurisdictional conflicts within and among
nations.”).
148 I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1566 (2010) (“Medical tourism is
already an important phenomenon in U.S. healthcare and growing steadily.”).
149 Id. at 1512 (“[A]dministering such a system would not be easy: it would require the
detection of the consumption of medical services abroad in a situation where neither party
has an incentive to alert the U.S. government. It would also require prosecutors and courts to
distinguish medical care purchased incident to other travel from medical tourism pursued as
the primary purpose for a trip.”).
150 Mark I. Harrison & Mary Gray Davidson, The Ethical Implications of Partnerships
and Other Associations Involving American and Foreign Lawyers, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L.
REV. 639, 639 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer
Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 324 (2004) (“Internet law practice can provide effective
legal assistance on routine matters . . . . [T]hese new business methods demand a clearer
theory of the appropriate scope of regulation than is provided by the existing analytical
framework.”); Robertson, supra note 91, at 178-79.
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regulatory authority.151 In other cases, however, potential clients may
communicate directly with overseas legal services vendors, bypassing U.S.
lawyers altogether.152 One company, located in India, advertises its ability to
work with self-represented litigants; it provides advice, document drafting and
preparation, and legal research.153 Foreign companies and individuals can also
bid for legal projects on Elance.com, a network for freelancing.154 One U.S.
resident – a nonlawyer – sought legal assistance with a foreclosure proceeding
in which he was attempting to represent himself.155 The client ended up hiring
a “Global Virtual Law Firm” based in India; the client awarded the firm “five
stars” for price, though only “two stars” for quality, commenting that the firm
“did not know local court rules very well, and answered some questions about
that incorrectly.”156 Another pro se litigant (a self-reported “demanding client”
and “very active pro se litigant”) hired the same firm to prepare a motion for
partial summary judgment to be filed in a court in Orange County, California;
that litigant awarded the firm five stars for quality, expertise, and cost.157 Selfrepresented litigants are at a significant disadvantage in litigation generally;
even a limited amount of help from an overseas legal service provider may
improve the litigant’s courtroom experience.158
These overseas service providers may violate state unauthorized practice of
law rules by providing legal advice and document drafting for state residents
pursuing litigation in state courts.159 Nonetheless, this activity is likely to be
151

Robertson, supra note 91, at 90 (“As with automated services, outsourcing the
preparation of legal documents may run up against state prohibitions on the unauthorized
practice of law.”).
152 Id. at 89-90 (“Offshore legal outsourcing supplies a global-labor arbitrage, making
legal services affordable to a broader range of litigants – but also putting some legal service
providers beyond the state’s regulatory reach.”).
153 Testimonials, SUNLEXIS, http://www.sunlexis.com/testimonials.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2013).
154 ELANCE, https://www.elance.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
155 Foreclosure Litigation Support, ELANCE (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.elance.com/s/
advjollyjohn/job-history/?t=1&k=foreclosure#search.
156 Id.
157 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-Orange County Ca Court [OCSC], ELANCE
(Oct. 22, 2011), https://www.elance.com/s/advjollyjohn/job-history/?t=1&k=Motion#search
(“NOT only is the work produced timely, its thorough, complete, well researched,
professionaly [sic] presented, properly formatted and ready for filing.”).
158 See Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship – a Legal
Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAMILY L.Q. 45, 46 (2011) (“Sixty-two percent of judges said
that outcomes were worse for the unrepresented parties.”); Cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Regulating Electronic Legal Support Across State and National Boundaries, 47 AKRON L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author).
159 Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical
and Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L.
401, 427-30 (2007) (“[O]ffshoring frequently raises the threshold issue of the unauthorized
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even harder for regulators to reach than medical tourism; the litigants’ free
speech rights likely protect their communications with offshore legal service
providers.160 The offshore service providers are also likely beyond the state’s
regulatory reach, as it would be an excessive assertion of legislative
jurisdiction for the United States to regulate the conditions under which such
providers can offer legal advice or assistance; an individual located in a foreign
country who merely communicates with individuals in the United States does
not thereby subject himself or herself to speech restrictions of domestic law.161
Furthermore, the opportunities for global cooperation in legal services are
increasing. Other countries have recently liberalized their practice rules in
ways that may allow them to compete for business with U.S. clients.162 In
England and Wales, the 2007 Legal Services Act liberalized the provision of
legal services.163 Provisions of the Act that went into effect in late 2011
permitted “law firms [to] seek investment from third parties for the first time

practice of law (UPL) because the work is being sent directly to foreign lawyers who are not
authorized to practice law in the United States or to vendors outside the United States who
employ the foreign lawyers and/or non-legal professionals.”); Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting:
Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271,
314 (2010) (“[A] large majority of states that explicitly define the practice of law consider
the drafting of legal documents to fit within the definition.”); Robertson, supra note 91, at
90-91.
160 Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (1981)
(“Unauthorized practice prohibitions plainly implicate first amendment values by restricting
both the lay speaker’s ability to convey information and the public’s opportunities to receive
it. If such restrictions impede access to the courts or the exercise of associational interests,
further constitutional questions arise.”); Robertson, supra note 91, at 91.
161 Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 815, 874 (2009) (“Global governance based on extraterritorial domestic laws is an
unsustainable and unstable system.”).
162 See Bruce MacEwen et al., Conversation: Law Firms, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 61 (2008) (exploring how the “prospect of major UK firms raising
capital in the equity markets . . . has the potential to produce seismic shifts in the global
market for legal services [including] far-reaching implications for the legal profession that
we can barely anticipate”).
163 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.); see also Thomas D. Morgan, The
Rise of Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1020 (2012) (“Although U.S.
lawyers are now barred from participating in multi-disciplinary firms that deliver legal
services in the United States, American clients can often get the services from firms
operating out of the United Kingdom or Australia, which have adopted programs permitting
– but registering and regulating – what the British call ‘alternative business structures.’”);
Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving
the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2242 (2010) (“The English and
Australian experiences, in particular, demonstrate that thinking about the profession as a
business does not have to mean the abandonment of ‘core values’ as the profession
evolves.”).
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and companies that are not law firms [to] provide legal services.”164 The Act
was dubbed the “Tesco Law” after a large British grocery retailer: with
retailers allowed to offer legal services, the law was thought to make it as easy
to buy legal services as it was to buy beans.165 In Australia, the Legal
Profession Acts permit “incorporated legal practices” and allow revenue
sharing with nonlawyers.166 As a result of the Australian reforms, the firm of
Slater & Gordon became the world’s first publicly traded law firm; its IPO
raised twenty-nine million dollars.167 After the English reforms of 2011 were
implemented, Slater & Gordon then purchased the U.K. firm of Russell Jones
& Walker for eighty-five million dollars.168
As these reforms take root, potential clients in the United States may be able
to work with legal services providers headquartered in England or Australia
because the General Agreement on the Trade of Services (GATS) prohibits
signatories from restricting “trading in a domestic market purely on the basis
of their business structure.”169 Thus, the effects of these international reforms
may hasten the pace of Professor Bill Henderson’s prediction: “In ten years,
much of the deregulation agenda will come to pass without any formal
164

Caroline Binham, OFT Says ‘Tesco Law’ Approvals Too Slow, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2013, 2:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/67a46fb8-615e-11e2-9545-00144feab49a.
html#axzz2L7w0hHdl.
165 Douglas McCollam, Law as a Tin of Beans: British Government Proposes Alternative
Business Structures for Law Firms to Make Legal System More Consumer-Friendly, N.J.
L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 20 (“Bridget Prentice, a minister at the Department of Constitutional
Affairs, said she envisioned a legal system where someone could pick a lawyer ‘as easily as
they can buy a tin of beans.’ Indeed, wags have dubbed the reforms the ‘Tesco Law’ after
the well-known British supermarket chain.”).
166 See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ch 2 ss 111(1), 128(1) (Austl.) (designating
corporations as “incorporated legal practices” regardless of whether they provide additional
nonlegal services or receive revenue from said services); Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers
Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2791, 2817 n.143 (2012) (“Every Australian state and territory but South Australia has
passed a similar act based on the Model Legal Profession Bill.”).
167 Johnson, supra note 112.
168 Id.; see also Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing
Experience, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 535 (2009) (“On May 21, 2007, Slater & Gordon
became the first law firm in the world to list its entire practice on the Australian Stock
Exchange. As this case study will illustrate, the process of listing raised significant ethical
and practical issues that had to be considered.”); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols,
and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 407, 407-08
(2008).
169 Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation—Responding to a
Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 518-19 (2009); see also
INT’L BAR ASS’N, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES, A HANDBOOK FOR
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION MEMBER BARS 10, http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/
s/lst3/IBA%20GATS%20Handbook%20final.pdf; Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC:
The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 881-82 (2010).
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deregulation. U.S. consumers and businesses are already voting with their
feet.”170 If this de facto deregulation excludes professionals licensed in the
United States, however, no one benefits – not the professionals who become
marginalized in the market for professional services, and not the clients
seeking affordable professional care.171
IV. CHALLENGING CORPORATE PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS
Given the counterproductive effects of the corporate practice doctrine, it
may surprise onlookers that the political process has not yet unseated the
doctrine. As the Supreme Court noted when upholding a state regulation that
forbade anyone but a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist from dispensing
glasses (including merely putting previously dispensed lenses into new
frames), legislative solutions are the preferred cure for unwise and improvident
state regulations.172 Legislative solutions, however, can be difficult to obtain.
It is true that the political process has had some limited success in the
medical field, as Congress has enacted laws allowing corporate practice for
HMOs and for the new “Accountable Care Organizations.”173 In addition, the
Federal Trade Commission’s challenge to the AMA rule may represent a
mixed political-judicial challenge to the rule against corporate practice.174
What we have not seen, however, is concerted action at the state legislative
level – for the most part, states have not been willing to overrule previous
restrictions on corporate practice systematically.175 This reluctance is
especially prevalent in the legal field,176 though it is also a factor in medicine
170

William Henderson, Are We Asking the Wrong Questions About Lawyer Regulation?,
TRUTH ON MKT. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/09/19/williamhenderson-on-are-we-asking-the-wrong-questions-about-lawyer-regulation.
171 See, e.g., Bill Henderson, Who Are These Companies?, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Feb. 2,
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/02/who-are-these-companies
.html (demonstrating that legal services companies are already making inroads into the
domestic legal market by posting a photo of the exhibitor list at the LegalTech New York
trade show and commenting, “[i]f you think that the ethics rules (MR 5.4) are keeping
nonlawyers out the legal industry, you need to come to LegalTech”).
172 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.” (quoting
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876))).
173 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (detailing how two instances of federal
legislation preempted state law restrictions on corporate practice in the medical services
industry).
174 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (explaining the FTC’s challenge and its
subsequent affirmation by the Second Circuit).
175 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (describing how certain state
restrictions on corporate practice have been preempted by federal law, while some states
actively attempted to restrict corporate practice with few states revisiting the issue in order
to permit it).
176 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3-4) (describing the results of a New York State
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as well; in fact, it helps explain why laws against the corporate practice of
medicine remained on the books even when they were unenforced at the state
level.177
Thus, as a practical matter, it is hard to obtain a political solution to the
corporate practice problem even when a majority of a state’s voters would, in
theory, favor such an outcome if given a voice on the matter. In practice, state
legislators may be reluctant to eliminate regulatory restrictions when those
who would benefit (middle class individuals seeking access to services) remain
unaware of the doctrine, while those who might face competition (licensed
professionals) are not only keenly aware of the doctrine, but in fact lobby
vigorously in favor of retaining the rule.178 State courts have also been
reluctant to abolish the doctrine under the common law, instead preferring to
defer to legislative bodies.179 Courts have expressed this deference even in
cases where the corporate practice doctrine itself had no statutory basis, but
was instead created as a common law doctrine by the same courts that were,
decades later, unwilling to repeal those doctrines without explicit legislative
permission.180
Bar Association survey in which “78% of lawyers in New York opposed the . . . proposal to
allow nonlawyer ownership in law firms”).
177 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (highlighting unenforced state law that, if
enforced, would restrict corporate practice in the medical services industry).
178 Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of
the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 403 (2013) (asserting that lawyers “lobbied
hard” against even the mere discussion of opening the profession to outside investment);
Gustavson & Taylor, supra note 100, at 493 (explaining that states adopted corporate
practice restrictions in response to lobbying from physicians through the American Medical
Association); Elizabeth A. Snelson, Physician Employment and Alternative Practice
Strategies: Avoiding “Company Doctor” Syndrome & Other Hospital Medical Staff Issues,
HEALTH LAW., Dec. 2008, at 14, 14 (explaining that the decision of some states to exempt
hospitals from the corporate practice ban arose in part “through hospital industry lobbying
in the legislatures and as parties and amici curiae in the courts”).
179 See, e.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn.
2005) (“We do not agree, however, that the courts are the proper forum to enact such policy
change. The legislature is the appropriate branch of government to debate and evaluate the
necessity of alternative forms of health care delivery in this state.”); Wash. Imaging Servs.
v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 252 P.3d 885, 890 (Wash. 2011) (“It is true that under the
common law corporate practice of medicine doctrine, absent legislative authorization, a
business may not engage in the practice of medicine by employing licensed physicians. . . .
However, the common law corporate practice of medicine doctrine does not prevent persons
without medical licenses from providing medical services through independent contractor
physicians.”).
180 Isles Wellness, 703 N.W.2d at 524; see also id. at 527 (Hanson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that to the extent that the corporate practice doctrine was part
of Minnesota’s common law, “I would not defer to the legislature, but see it as the court’s
responsibility to reexamine our own ruling”); Wash. Imaging Servs., 252 P.3d at 890
(“[U]nder the common law corporate practice of medicine doctrine, absent legislative
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Political solutions are doubly difficult to obtain in the field of lawyer
regulation. Because state courts have historically been charged with exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law under the separation of powers
doctrine, legislative changes by themselves may have no practical effect even
if adopted – state courts have shown a willingness to strike down legislation
that infringes on the courts’ exclusive power to regulate legal practice.181 And
when both the state legislature and the state courts have adopted restrictions on
the corporate practice of law, then it can be especially difficult to challenge
those restrictions.182 First, success in one arena would be insufficient to change
the rule – to be successful, a challenger would have to challenge both the
statute and the court rule. Second, and further complicating the issue, is a
question of timing: If the statute’s effect is not clear, judges may want to
abstain from deciding a constitutional challenge to it; but if the statute is not
challenged, then a challenge to the court rule may well be moot.183
Jacoby & Meyers’s challenge to New York’s corporate practice restrictions
demonstrates the difficulty of challenging these restrictions within the larger
thicket of lawyer regulation.184 If the firm challenged a state statute that was
less than clear, but that could be interpreted to forbid corporate practice, the
district court might reasonably abstain from deciding the case under Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., as the state courts had not yet had an opportunity
to interpret the statute.185 If the firm did not challenge the statute, however,
authorization, a business may not engage in the practice of medicine by employing licensed
physicians.”).
181 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 17) (“[M]ost state courts assert their right to
independently, if not exclusively, regulate the legal profession and as we have seen, caselaw
states that the doctrine is judicial not legislative in origin.”); e.g., Beyers v. Richmond, 937
A.2d 1082, 1089 (Pa. 2007) (“Any legislative enactment encroaching upon this Court’s
exclusive power to regulate attorney conduct would be unconstitutional.”); Bennion, Van
Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 736 (Wash. 1981) (“Since the
regulation of the practice of law is within the sole province of the judiciary, encroachment
by the legislature may be held by this court to violate the separation of powers doctrine.”).
182 See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third & Fourth
Departmentts, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 488 F.
App’x 526, 527 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The district court held that plaintiffs’ injury could not be
redressed by invalidation of Rule 5.4 because other provisions of New York state law, the
constitutionality of which plaintiffs specifically declined to challenge, independently and
unambiguously prohibit non-lawyer investment in law firms and would continue to prohibit
them from accepting non-lawyer equity investors even if Rule 5.4 were struck down.”).
183 Id. at 527 (“The district court concluded that, in light of the multiple laws prohibiting
plaintiffs’ proposed conduct, any ruling it might issue regarding Rule 5.4 would be merely
advisory.”).
184 Id. (remanding to permit amendment to the complaint so that all provisions of state
law prohibiting nonlawyer investment are challenged).
185 Id. (“At oral argument, Jacoby & Meyers confirmed that it had declined to challenge
the other provisions of New York state law out of a concern that the district court, relying on
uncertainty about the meaning of state law, would abstain from deciding the case . . . .”
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then any challenge to the ethics rule would be merely advisory, as long as the
statute prohibited the same conduct.186 The Second Circuit resolved the
dilemma by accepting the State’s assertion that the statute should in fact be
interpreted to prohibit corporate practice, and concluded that the State would
therefore be judicially estopped from arguing in favor of Pullman abstention,
paving the way for the district court to consider the challenge on its merits
after remand.187
A.

A Rational Basis?

Given the political difficulties inherent in eradicating corporate practice
restrictions, it is not surprising that opponents would turn to constitutional
arguments.188 The corporate practice doctrine remains something of a
“zombie” legal rule at the current time.189 Almost no one believes that it serves
a legitimate policy purpose,190 but it remains propped up by rent-seeking
individuals who are loath to give up regulations protecting them from
competition.191 And killing part of the doctrine does nothing to stop the
remaining pieces from creating mischief;192 instead, the doctrine has a way of
(citing R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941))).
186 Id. (“The district court concluded that, in light of the multiple laws prohibiting
plaintiffs’ proposed conduct, any ruling it might issue regarding Rule 5.4 would be merely
advisory.”).
187 Id. (“Because the district court and appellees agree that Judiciary Law § 495 and LLC
Law § 201, as authoritatively interpreted by the state courts; unambiguously prohibit nonlawyer investment in law firms, Pullman abstention is unnecessary, and the district court
can proceed to adjudicate the parties’ dispute as to whether those statutes, and Rule 5.4, are
constitutional.”).
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Daniel R. Shulman, Refusals to Deal: Is Anything Left; Should There Be?,
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 111 (2010) (defining a “zombie doctrine” as one that “even though
it should be dead, . . . keeps on coming”).
190 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (making the case that the primary goals
of the corporate practice doctrine are economic protectionism and a misguided attempt to
protect clients); see also Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory
Scheme that Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 WASHBURN
L.J. 669, 694 (2009) (“[A] law firm’s goal of making profit and its duty to provide
competent, ethical representation to its clients are not in opposition to each other; a law firm
can only maximize its profits by providing competent, quality, ethical representation.”);
Rhode, supra note 160, at 99 (“Absent evidence of significant injury resulting from lay
assistance, individuals should be entitled to determine the cost and quality of legal services
that best meet their needs. Where there are demonstrable grounds for paternalism, it should
emanate from institutions other than the organized bar.”).
191 See supra Part II (arguing that the corporate practice doctrine keeps legal fee rates
prohibitively high for middle class consumers).
192 See supra text accompanying notes 183-86 (describing the difficulty in assailing a
doctrine comprised of both statutes and regulations, which can neither be adequately
attacked together or apart for procedural and practical reasons).
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springing back into life after being pronounced dead.193 A successful
constitutional challenge, however, would decapitate the doctrine, successfully
eradicating it once and for all, in both medicine and law.194 Such a
constitutional challenge presents an uphill battle under current doctrine, but it
is a battle worth fighting.
Under the Supreme Court’s “freedom of contract” jurisprudence of the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the case against the corporate practice
doctrine might have gained traction had a challenge been brought at that time.
The legal conception of freedom of contract arose in England with the growth
of laissez faire economics, and migrated from there into British and U.S.
law.195 By the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had held
that “the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual protected by [the Due Process Clause], is settled by the decisions of
this Court and is no longer open to question.”196 During this period, however,
the Court was criticized for going too far with the freedom of contract doctrine,
especially to the extent that the Court struck down labor legislation perceived
as beneficial to the working class and important to improving industrial
conditions.197 Lochner v. New York,198 in which the Court struck down a state
statute limiting work hours for bakery employees, became emblematic of the
Court’s freedom of contract jurisprudence.199
193

Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 253 (“While the doctrine may seem too outdated to be
enforced, the statutes and regulations that form the doctrine remain in current statutory
compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight stimulus to be set into action.”).
194 Cf. Erik Henrickson, How to Kill a Zombie, PORTLAND MERCURY (Sept. 16, 2004),
http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/how-to-kill-a-zombie/Content?oid=32136 (“To
kill zombies, you need to destroy their brains. The most surefire route is simply lopping off
the cranium . . . . [A]nything less than 100 percent severance just isn’t good enough.”).
195 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 294 (1979) (“The fact is
that the concept of freedom of contract was at the very heart of classical economics, and
there is good ground for thinking that the common lawyers may have taken over the concept
from the economists in the early part of the nineteenth century.”); see also Martin J. Doris,
Did We Lose the Baby with the Bath Water? The Late Scholastic Contribution to the
Common Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 361, 361 (2005) (“Common law
opinion, in particular, has almost universally accepted that the emergence of the doctrine of
freedom of contract in English law is owed much to the dominance of classical liberalism
and laissez-faire economics in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”).
196 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (citations omitted).
197 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 474 (1909) (“After 1900, the
pendulum had clearly begun to swing the other way. But there are a number of striking
decisions taking extreme views as to liberty of contract prior to the Adair case.” (discussing
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908))).
198 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“Under such circumstances the
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their employment,
and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the
Federal Constitution.”).
199 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 1 (“Lochner is likely the most disreputable case in
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In the 1930s, the Court became more willing to uphold state labor
regulations, signaling a new direction in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
which overruled earlier precedent and upheld a state act establishing a
minimum wage for female employees.200 The Court’s jurisprudential shift
arrived just as professional licensing was growing and corporate practice
restrictions were arriving in the wake of licensing laws.201 In changing
directions on freedom of contract, the Court swung the pendulum to its
opposite extreme.202 Under the framework of rational basis review, the Court
became willing to uphold state economic regulations on the most tenuous
grounds – even when there was no evidence of the effectiveness of the
regulation, as when Oklahoma refused to allow nonmedical professionals to fit
new frames for pre-existing eyeglass lenses,203 or when Kansas prohibited
anyone but a licensed attorney from negotiating with creditors for debt
reduction.204 In contrast to its earlier freedom of contract jurisprudence, the
Court now took an entirely hands-off position with regard to economic
regulation, stating that it “refuse[d] to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation,’”205 and “emphatically refuse[d] to go back to the time
when courts used the Due Process Clause ‘to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.’”206 Thus,
even a law enacted for overtly protectionist purposes would not be struck
down.207
modern constitutional discourse.”); Pound, supra note 197, at 479 (describing the Lochner
opinion as “the reactionary view” of “a bare majority” of the Court).
200 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does
not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.”).
201 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (estimating that the doctrine arose in
both the medical and legal professions around 1928).
202 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 103 (“Debate has raged among historians as to
whether West Coast Hotel marked an abrupt break with the past, or whether the Court
simply chose to follow the more liberal precedents regarding the police power’s scope. . . .
Regardless, it seems reasonably clear that as of 1937 there were not yet five votes to
completely abandon liberty of contract.”).
203 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
204 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (“It is now settled that States ‘have
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law.’” (quoting Lincoln Fed.
Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949))).
205 Id. at 731 (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)).
206 Id. at 731-32 (quoting Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488).
207 Id. at 732 (“Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it
is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”).
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The corporate practice doctrine survived the Supreme Court’s review in the
1930s because it protected the profession against “unseemly rivalry” – a
sufficient basis even under the stricter rational basis review of the Lochner
era.208 In later years, other protectionist laws that were adopted at the same
time, and with the same goals as the corporate practice doctrine (most notably
the prohibitions on professional advertising), were subsequently struck down
on First Amendment grounds.209 The corporate practice doctrine, however,
remained in play. Unlike the advertising restrictions that had to stand up to
heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment, the corporate practice
doctrine merely had to survive under the lower rational basis standard, and by
this era, the courts applied that standard exceedingly deferentially.210 As
scholars have pointed out, the Supreme Court was then willing to uphold
legislative action as long as “there was any rational thought conceivable behind
the law – even if it was not actually on the minds of most of the legislators who
voted for it.”211 Under this extraordinarily deferential standard, almost any law
would be upheld.212 So the corporate practice restrictions that were originally
intended to prevent the same “unseemly rivalry” as advertising prohibitions
could now be upheld on the basis that they might protect the public from
harmful professional services.213
Nevertheless, some have suggested that the Court’s extreme deference in
rational basis review has reached its outer limits and have posited that there are
signs the Court may be willing to inquire into the “rationality” of legislation a
bit more skeptically.214 In fact, in a few cases in subsequent decades, the Court
208

Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1935) (“We have
held that the state may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the personal
obligations of individuals and that it may prohibit advertising that tends to mislead the
public in this respect . . . the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only
against deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by
forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the
least scrupulous.” (citing Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563
(1932))).
209 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
210 Id. at 368-79; Semler, 294 U.S. at 611.
211 Elizabeth Price Foley, Judicial Engagement, Written Constitutions, and the Value of
Preservation: The Case of Individual Rights, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 909, 921 (2012).
212 U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“Where, as here, there are
plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course,
‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision . .
. .’” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))).
213 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
214 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 679 (3d ed.
2006) (“[I]t also can be argued that the Court has gone too far in its deference under the
rational basis test. Unfair laws are allowed to stand because a conceivable legitimate
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has actually struck down legislation even under a rational basis standard,215
including a state licensing decision excluding former members of the
Communist Party from the practice of law.216 Others, however, have suggested
that such review is not a sign of retrenchment, but rather a moderately
heightened standard to be applied in cases of political or social animus.217
The question of how much “bite” to give rational basis review took a central
position in the argument over the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor.218 The district court concluded that
“the rational basis analysis can vary by context,” with “a more searching form”
purpose can be identified for virtually any law.”); Sandefur, supra note 11, at 487 (“But as
Romer, Cleburne, and similar cases have demonstrated, a realistic rationality review need
not intrude upon the abilities of legislatures to make legitimate policies.”); see also Hettinga
v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, C.J., concurring) (“The
practical effect of rational basis review of economic regulation is the absence of any check
on the group interests that all too often control the democratic process. . . . Rational basis
review means property is at the mercy of the pillagers. The constitutional guarantee of
liberty deserves more respect—a lot more.”).
215 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down a law prohibiting local
governments from including sexual orientation as a protected category in antidiscrimination
laws, and finding the ostensible purpose of the legislation to be “so far removed” from the
“breadth of the amendment” that it was “impossible to credit them”); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (striking down a zoning law that excluded
group homes for individuals with developmental disabilities, and emphasizing that even
under rational basis review, “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship
to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational”);
Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (striking down a discriminatory tax on
insurance companies).
216 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (“There is no
evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Schware was morally unfit to
practice law.”).
217 Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 937
(2012). The Obama Administration, in a recent Supreme Court brief, referred to this idea as
rational basis review “with added focus” in order to distinguish it from the traditional notion
of heightened scrutiny. Even here, however, the Administration limited the role of “added
focus” to cases involving animus against politically disfavored groups. Brief for the United
States on the Merits Question at 52-54, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048 (“[T]he history of discrimination and the absence of
relation to one’s capabilities associated with this particular classification would uniquely
qualify it for scrutiny under an approach that calls for a measure of added focus to guard
against giving effect to a desire to harm an ‘unpopular group.’” Id. at 53).
218 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from
this history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage. ‘[D]iscriminations of an
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996))); see Nancy C. Marcus, “Argle Bargle,”or Deeply-Rooted Principles of Equal
Liberty? The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY
(forthcoming 2014).
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applied in cases of animus against the politically disfavored, and a more
deferential form in cases involving economic or regulatory issues.219 On
appeal, the Second Circuit held that heightened scrutiny applied and provided
an alternate basis to strike down the law, which allowed the court to avoid
deciding whether the district court correctly applied the more stringent version
of the rational basis test.220 The Second Circuit expressed gratitude for the
escape valve, observing that “fortunately” it need not decide which formulation
of rational basis review to apply, an area that the court found was subject to
“doctrinal instability,” as the Supreme Court had never “expressly sanctioned
such modulation in the level of rational basis review.”221
In its decision in Windsor, the Supreme Court did not eliminate this
“doctrinal instability.”222 As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, “[t]he
opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been the
central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause,
laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than
mere rationality.”223 The Court did, however, appear to invoke the rational
basis standard in striking down the federal ban on same sex marriage: the
Court held that “no legitimate purpose” supported the statute in light of the fact
that DOMA was intended to “disparage and to injure those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”224 Thus, the
Court appeared to weigh the statute’s reported animus in its analysis of a
legitimate purpose; the existence of such animus perhaps reduced the
deference the Court was willing to give to the legislative purpose, even under
the rational basis standard.225
Although dealing with a challenge to a very different statute, the Supreme
Court in Windsor appeared to extend the rational basis test that it had earlier
applied in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Ward, where the Court struck down
an Alabama statute that charged out-of-state insurance companies higher tax

219 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d
169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
220 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 180-81, aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has
not expressly sanctioned such modulation in the level of rational basis review; discussion
pro and con has largely been confined to concurring and dissenting opinions. We think it is
safe to say that there is some doctrinal instability in this area. Fortunately, no permutation of
rational basis review is needed if heightened scrutiny is available, as it is in this case. We
therefore decline to join issue with the dissent, which explains why Section 3 of DOMA
may withstand rational basis review.”).
221 Id.
222 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692, 2696 (asserting that DOMA requires “careful
consideration” while simultaneously inquiring whether the law serves a “legitimate
purpose,” the language of traditional rational basis review).
223 Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 2696.
225 Id.

218

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:179

rates than in-state companies.226 In Ward, the Court likewise found that there
was “no legitimate state purpose” that could counteract the discriminatory
nature of the tax.227 As in Windsor, the Court in Ward appeared to weigh the
policy interests advanced by the government against the discriminatory means
employed: thus, while encouraging in-state capital investment might be a
legitimate state purpose in a vacuum, it would not be a legitimate state purpose
“when furthered by discrimination.”228
Justice O’Connor dissented in Ward, stating that she found the Court’s
holding “astonishing” and “threatening [to] the freedom of both state and
federal legislative bodies to fashion appropriate classifications in economic
legislation.”229 She criticized the Court’s decision for “collapsing the two
prongs of the rational basis test into one” and thereby avoiding the need to
“engag[e] in the deferential inquiry we have adopted as a brake on judicial
impeachment of legislative policy choices.”230 Justice O’Connor was right that
the Court had merged the two prongs of the rational basis test into a single
scale, and right that by merging the two, the Court was able to apply a stricter
version of the rational basis test than it had in earlier decades.231 Nearly three
decades later, Justice Scalia made a similar point in his Windsor dissent,
stating:
I would review this classification only for its rationality. As nearly as I
can tell, the Court agrees with that; its opinion does not apply strict
scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases
like Moreno. But the Court certainly does not apply anything that
resembles that deferential framework.232
Both Ward and Windsor suggest that the Court may be applying a rational
basis test that is less deferential than the one it applied in Lee Optical, and one
that allows the legitimacy of the state’s purpose to be evaluated in the context
of the facts at hand, not merely in a hypothetical vacuum. Thus, the purpose of
226 Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (assessing whether the state law
served a “legitimate” purpose, while investigating the proffered purposes at length,
suggesting a less deferential approach than that employed in traditional rational basis
review).
227 Id. (“We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by the Alabama
domestic preference tax statute . . . is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here.”).
228 Id. at 882.
229 Id. at 883 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 898.
231 Id. at 884 (“Our precedents impose a heavy burden on those who challenge local
economic regulation solely on Equal Protection Clause grounds. In this context, our longestablished jurisprudence requires us to defer to a legislature’s judgment if the classification
is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.”).
232 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).

2014]

PRIVATE ORDERING

219

ensuring uniformity in the definition of marriage might be a legitimate
legislative purpose – but not when motivated by malice and discriminatory
motivations. Likewise, protecting capital investment could be a legitimate state
purpose – but not when motivated by a desire to discriminate against out-ofstate businesses. Such a contextual test also finds support in Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London, where he wrote:
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor
a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause must strike down a government classification that is
clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only
incidental or pretextual public justifications.233
For Justice Kennedy in Kelo, and for the Court in Ward and Windsor, context
is important: what might be a legitimate state interest in the abstract may not
be a legitimate state interest in a particular context of discrimination.
Thus, context matters in rationality review.234 But what are the limits of this
doctrine? What counts as a discriminatory or improper motive sufficient to
overcome an otherwise legitimate state purpose? These questions are
paramount in the so-called “economic liberty” cases,235 where a recent circuit
233

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Although the importance of a fact-based contextual analysis has often been
overlooked in rational basis review, the idea is not a new one. The Supreme Court
advocated this approach in a 1938 decision:
[U]nder the burden of proof favored by Justice Harlan and adopted by Justice Brandeis,
it was still permissible for a person to challenge a legislative restriction on liberty by
showing that it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory. This was made
abundantly clear by the New Deal Court in the landmark 1938 case of United States v.
Carolene Products Co. Although this case is known for the most famous footnote in
the history of the Supreme Court—the celebrated Footnote Four—in the less wellstudied body of the case, Justice Stone reaffirmed judicial scrutiny of the
reasonableness of a statute was still available. “Where the existence of a rational basis
for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere
of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and
the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of
facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.”
See Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee
Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845, 849 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938)).
235 Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest
Under Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 501 (2013) (“[M]any licensing
laws not only curb competition, but also stunt social mobility. Licensing regulations are
particularly harmful to low-income workers who have the requisite skills to compete, but
lack either formal training or financial resources to meet the onerous licensure
requirements.” (footnote omitted)); Marc P. Florman, Comment, The Harmless Pursuit of
Happiness: Why “Rational Basis with Bite” Review Makes Sense for Challenges to
234
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split regarding casket-sale restrictions provides an excellent test case to give
shape to this contextual rational basis test.
A number of states have restricted casket sales to licensed mortuary
professionals; like other protectionist practices, however, this restriction raises
prices and proponents offer no evidence that the public suffers any actual harm
by an open market for caskets.236 Nevertheless, circuit courts adopted different
positions representing the two views of rational basis review.
The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles v. Giles affirmed a decision striking down
Tennessee’s restriction on casket sales to licensed funeral directors.237 The
court took care to distinguish its holding from Lochner’s more stringent review
of economic regulations.238 Nevertheless, the court found that each of the
Government’s proffered defenses of the measure failed a rational basis review.
The court first concluded that “protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”239 Then,
turning to the State’s consumer protection rationales, the court rejected
arguments that licensing vendors would improve the quality and safety of the
caskets themselves; the court noted that the State could certainly regulate
Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 721, 758 (2012) (“While there are many good
arguments in support of the use of rational basis with bite review whenever any economic
regulation enacted under the state police power is challenged, this comment takes a much
narrower position: that occupational licensing statutes (i.e., regulations that infringe on the
specific part of economic liberty that encompasses the right to pursue one’s chosen
profession) should be subjected to rational basis with bite review.”).
236 Lana Harfoush, Comment, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral
Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It
Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 159 (2011) (“Those occupational licensing
laws are based upon a meritless ‘because I said so’ justification. This helps a select few, but
leaves many hardworking, honest entrepreneurs, who labor in harmless occupations, out in
the cold. The circuit split that exists today provides some hope that purely protectionist
occupational licenses will not stand.”); Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation
Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic
Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 687 (2004)
(“Testimony was taken at trial in Craigmiles that a leaky casket could pose a threat to public
health, but in practice that threat is nonexistent. . . . Caskets are not even meant to protect
health and safety. The very concept of an ‘unsafe casket’ is a hollow one.”).
237
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a licensure
requirement designed for a funeral directors’ application to an independent casket retailer
was not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose, therefore violating both
equal protection and due process, and further holding that protection of discrete interests
from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose).
238 Id. (“Our decision today is not a return to Lochner, by which this court would elevate
its economic theory over that of legislative bodies . . . no sophisticated economic analysis is
required to see the pretextual nature of the state’s proffered explanations for the 1972
amendment.”).
239 Id. at 224 (“[P]rotecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a
legitimate governmental purpose.”).
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casket quality directly – in the absence of such regulation, allowing
competition for casket sales would be more likely to raise quality relative to
price.240 Additionally, while the State had argued that “the course of study
required for licensure trains directors in the best ways to treat individuals who
have suffered profound loss,” and therefore “[u]nlicensed casket retailers,
without this psychological training . . . may aggravate the grief of the
decedent’s survivors who are shopping for a casket,”241 the court disagreed.
Instead, it concluded that consumers would still deal with trained funeral
directors for mortuary services, thus receiving the benefit of their training, but
would also deal with “panoply” of unlicensed vendors for other services.242
Thus, the court concluded that the measure “privilege[d] certain businessmen
over others at the expense of consumers,” was “not animated by a legitimate
governmental purpose,” and therefore “cannot survive even rational basis
review.”243
The Tenth Circuit applied a more deferential standard of review in Powers
v. Harris,244 and consequently upheld Oklahoma’s casket law.245 Interestingly,
the court’s most fundamental disagreement with Craigmiles arose from the
question of whether pure protectionism could constitute a legitimate state
interest; while the Sixth Circuit had rejected that proposition, the Tenth Circuit
was willing to accept it.246 The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence allowed protectionism as long as it merely favored one industry
over another without burdening interstate commerce, and concluded that
“while baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing out
special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the favored
pastime of state and local governments.”247 The court therefore held that
“[b]ecause we find that intra-state economic protectionism, absent a violation
of a specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state
240

Id. at 226 (“Generally, however, the cost of more protective caskets is higher . . . [i]f
casket retailers were to increase competition on casket prices and bring those prices closer
to marginal costs, then more protective caskets would become more affordable for
consumers with limited funds and their use would likely increase.”).
241 Id. at 228.
242 Id. (“Moreover, survivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make
funeral arrangements, from churches to food vendors for a wake, none of whom is required
to have this psychological training. This justification is very weak, indeed.”).
243 Id. at 229.
244 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004).
245 Id. at 1225 (“Because we hold that intrastate economic protectionism, absent a
violation of a specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state
interest and that the [statute] is rationally related to this legitimate end, we AFFIRM.”).
246 Id. at 1218-19 (“Because the four Supreme Court cases cited in Craigmiles and
Santos do not stand for the proposition that intrastate economic protectionism, absent a
violation of a specific constitutional provision of federal statute, is an illegitimate state
interest, we cannot agree [that such protectionism is illegitimate].”).
247 Id. at 1219-21.
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interest, we have little difficulty determining that the [statute] satisfies rational
basis review.”248 Finally, though the protectionism argument was dispositive,
the court also expressed approval of the State’s hypothetical consumer
protection rationale249 in spite of the fact that, as in Craigmiles, the evidence
contradicted the assertion of actual improvement in consumer welfare.250
More recently, after considering the split between the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Craigmiles was correct in concluding that mere economic protectionism could
not be a legitimate government interest, as it would be “a naked transfer of
wealth.”251 Nevertheless, the court concluded that under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lee Optical, even a policy founded on economic protectionism
would be constitutionally permissible if “supported by a post hoc perceived
rationale.”252 The court therefore concluded that casket-sale restrictions should
be upheld only if the state could show a rational basis for such restrictions that
was “not plainly refuted . . . on the record compiled by the district court at
trial.”253 After examining the evidence presented at trial, the court affirmed the
district court’s decision to strike down the regulation; it agreed with the district
court’s findings that the facts belied the post hoc rationales proffered by the
State.254 For example, the State argued that the law could be justified by its
protection of consumer interests, but the court concluded that the undisputed
facts demonstrated that the exclusive-sale provision “adds nothing to protect
consumers and puts them at a greater risk of abuse including exploitive
prices.”255 Likewise, the court concluded that the State’s health-and-safety
rationale to limit casket sales was contradicted by the State’s failure to require
caskets for burial and failure to place any requirements on the design or
construction of caskets.256 The court concluded that both consumer protection
248

Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1227 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[T]he district court did not err in crediting
the consumer protection rationale advanced by the Board.”).
250 Id. (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the evidence showed that
“[c]onsumer interests appear to be harmed rather than protected by the limitation of choice
and price encouraged by the licensing restrictions on intrastate casket sales”).
251 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 423 (2013) (“[N]either precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic
protection of a particular industry is a legitimate governmental purpose, but economic
protection, that is favoritism, may well be supported by a post hoc perceived rationale . . .
without which it is aptly described as a naked transfer of wealth.”).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 223.
254 Id. at 226 (“That grant of an exclusive right of sale adds nothing to protect consumers
and puts them at a greater risk of abuse including exploitative prices.”).
255 Id.
256 Id. (“That Louisiana does not even require a casket for burial, does not impose
requirements for their construction or design, does not require a casket to be sealed before
burial, and does not require funeral directors to have any special expertise in caskets leads
249
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and health and safety could justify state regulation of caskets in theory, but the
record developed in the trial court negated the possibility that either
consideration was actually related to the regulation in question.257
Thus, there is a split of authority over questions of rational basis review
relevant to the corporate practice doctrine, including whether economic
protectionism is a legitimate state interest,258 what kind of showing is
necessary to negate a hypothetical state interest,259 and whether a purported
rational basis can be overcome by countervailing “evidence of irrationality.”260
If the Supreme Court ultimately sides with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation on
either of the first two counts – or accepts the Fifth Circuit’s invitation to allow
evidentiary development as in the third – then economic liberty cases may
receive greater attention, and economic liberties would receive greater
protection.261 Regardless of how the tea leaves should be read, it is apparent

us to conclude that no rational relationship exists between public health and safety and
limiting intrastate sales of caskets to funeral establishments.”).
257 Id. at 227.
258 See, e.g., Katharine M. Rudish, Unearthing the Public Interest: Recognizing
Intrastate Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State Interest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
1485, 1530 (2012) (“Making it unconstitutional for a state to protect a particular industry
through regulation goes against the federalism and judicial-activism concerns underpinning
the Court’s economic substantive due process jurisprudence since the demise of Lochner.”);
Florman, supra note 235, at 734 (“[The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles] reasoned that because
‘protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
governmental purpose,’ the occupational licensing requirements were unconstitutional, as
applied to the plaintiff casket retailers. The Tenth Circuit in Powers disagreed.”).
259 Sanders, supra note 236, at 692-94 (“This failure of the Craigmiles court to
emphasize the irrelevance of the licensing standards pertains to criticism of Craigmiles in
Powers v. Harris. In that case . . . [t]he district judge critiqued Craigmiles, stating that the
Sixth Circuit used policy arguments in striking down the licensing restrictions. Policy
arguments are not allowed under the rational basis test, argued the court, so the Sixth Circuit
[in Craigmiles] went beyond its authority in weighing the pros and cons of licensing versus
increased competition in the casket market.” (citations omitted)); see also Harfoush, supra
note 236, at 159.
260 Castille, 712 F.3d at 223 (“[A]lthough rational basis review places no affirmative
evidentiary burden on the government, plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly
plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”). Although the Castille
court’s use of the phrase “evidence of irrationality” suggests that an evidentiary hearing
could be a proper means of negating possible state interests, the Supreme Court has
historically discouraged evidentiary proceedings. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”).
261 Ezra B. Hood, Interpreting in the Public Interest: How Macey’s Canon Can Restore
Economic Liberty, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 441, 476-77 (2009) (“Where a court gives
so much deference to a majoritarian legislature that even made up rationales for libertyrestricting laws are acceptable, the only check remaining on that legislature are the politics
by which it is elected. . . . However, public choice theory’s insight into how collective
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that the Supreme Court will need to decide the limits of rational basis review.
The corporate practice doctrine provides a good vehicle to test whether the
Court would be willing to retreat from the most extreme version of the rational
basis test.
Moving away from the more extreme forms of deference that the Court has
applied in the last few decades would require at most a change in
interpretation, but not a change in the nominal standard. Even if it applied the
“old-school” rule of rational basis review that invalidated only arbitrary and
irrational legislation, the Court could still require “a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained,” and to the means of attaining it.262
If the Court is serious about requiring such a “real and substantial relation,”
the corporate practice doctrine should not stand. One scholar has analyzed the
factors that might go into such an evaluation, suggesting striking the law down
under a rational basis test if some or all of the following conditions are met:
[E]vidence of an intent to benefit one group of people at the expense of
others, i.e., protectionism; evidence refuting the law’s ostensible publicinterest rationale; the presence of less restrictive alternatives to satisfy the
law’s ostensible purpose; evidence showing a harm to competition and
consumers; and, perhaps, evidence that the law may interfere with
interstate commerce.263
These factors bear similarities to the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Craigmiles,
as the court found that the casket-sale restrictions arose from protectionism,
that the restriction caused consumer and commercial harm by raising prices,
and that the evidence suggested that any hypothetical consumer protection
benefits had failed to materialize in practice.264 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has
agreed that evidence countering the state’s hypothetical rationale can “negate a
seemingly plausible basis” for the law, observing that “a hypothetical rationale,
even post hoc, cannot be fantasy.”265 These factors provide a useful lens for

majorities actually function gives solemn warning about how poorly majoritarian
legislatures might be trusted truly to express the public interest.”).
262 Foley, supra note 211, at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)).
263
Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism as a Rational Basis? The Impact on E-Commerce in
the Funeral Industry, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 189, 213 (2007) (footnote omitted).
264 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).
265 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e question
whether [the rationale offered] is betrayed by the undisputed facts as pretextual.”); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 170607 (1984) (suggesting that the requirement for a rational basis “‘filters out’ illegitimate
motivations,” so that “[w]hen the asserted benefits turn out to be illusory, or are minimal in
relation to the burdens imposed, there is good reason to suspect that an illegitimate
motivation – something other than the asserted benefits – in fact accounts for the
regulation”).
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applying the contextual type of rational basis review that the Court endorsed in
Ward and Windsor.266
Applying these five elements to the corporate practice doctrine likewise
suggests that the restrictions on outside investment should be struck down, and
that the Supreme Court should recognize a right to contract within the market
for professional services. First, even if protectionist intent was not clear at the
time the doctrine was first adopted, it is certainly apparent in the failure of later
attempts to repeal the doctrine.267 In spite of warnings from the FTC as to the
anticompetitive nature of the restrictions, and in spite of various committee
proposals to permit outside investment, lawyers overwhelmingly expressed a
fear of competition from outside parties and thus chose to retain the rule nearly
every time the issue came up.268 Likewise, the medical profession did not drop
the national rule until it was forced to after losing the FTC’s law suit; even
afterward, a number of states continued to prohibit physicians from accepting
employment with corporate entities.269
Similarly, evidence contrary to the stated public interest rationale and
evidence showing harm to consumers are both apparent as well; there is ample
evidence that the doctrine raises prices and decreases access to legal and
medical services, and there is no countervailing evidence that it increases the
quality of services rendered.270 And, as in the casket cases, there are a number
of less restrictive ways to achieve the same ends. To the extent that the state is
interested in ensuring independent judgment, it can regulate that directly by
prohibiting outside investors from interfering with professional care.271 The

266 See supra notes 218-35 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s approach in Windsor, where
it “extend[ed] the rational-basis test that it had earlier applied in Metropolitan Life
Insurance v. Ward, in which the Court struck down an Alabama statute that charged out-ofstate insurance companies higher tax rates than in-state companies”).
267 See supra Parts I & II.
268 See supra Parts I & II. The FTC brought suit against the AMA, after which the AMA
dropped its corporate practice restrictions. The bar rebuffed pressure from the FTC and an
ABA Commission, as well as proposals to liberalize the ABA’s rules and align them more
closely with the District of Columbia’s, which would have allowed for limited investment
by private individuals in firms providing exclusively legal services.
269 See supra Part I.A.
270 See supra Parts II & III.
271 See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn. 2005)
(“[T]he policy concerns underlying the doctrine-division of loyalty, conflict of interest, and
the interference with and/or loss of independent, professional judgment-are more
appropriately and accurately addressed through licensing laws, which can include
requirements such as that health care providers use their independent judgment.”); Harris &
Foran, supra note 2, at 836 (“The experience of the medical profession suggests that
legitimate concerns over loss of professional autonomy to the detriment of clients can be
adequately addressed through a combination of ethical rules and liability deterrents.”); Lisa
Rediger Hayward, Revising Washington’s Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71
WASH. L. REV. 403, 430 (1996) (“Although the justifications for the doctrine were once
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct already do this for conduct that is
equally risky, but too common to prohibit; thus, for example, a lawyer may
accept payment from a person other than the client (for example, the client’s
employer, parent, or spouse could pay for legal services) – but in the case of a
third-party payer, a lawyer is simply told that he or she “shall not permit” the
payer “to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in the rendering
of such services.”272 Finally, the corporate practice doctrine may well interfere
with interstate commerce. Certainly, the healthcare market operates within the
stream of interstate commerce,273 and recent trends toward globalization also
help in erasing the importance of state barriers within the legal market.274
Legal service providers such as LegalZoom and Law Pivot already operate
across state borders; restricting their activity in an effort to promote
independent solo practitioners would burden interstate commerce.275 Thus, the
Court could (and should) easily conclude that although protecting the public
from substandard legal advice and medical care is a legitimate state interest,
the corporate practice doctrine offers no such protection. As a result, there is
no legitimate state interest in discriminating against corporate ownership in the
provision of professional services.
B.

The Case for Heightened Scrutiny

As the prior Section argues, a rational basis challenge to the corporate
practice doctrine will succeed only if the Supreme Court is willing to apply the
test less deferentially than it has done in past decades.276 This is not
impossible; there are signs that the Court may be willing to protect economic
liberties somewhat more rigorously than it has for most of the last century, and
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ approach to protectionist restrictions offers a
guide for such a challenge.277 Nonetheless, such a challenge offers an uphill
valid, they are presently addressed by other measures and hence, have lost their legitimacy
in the new health care market. Modern regulations are available to protect the patient from
the ‘quackery’ that the corporate prohibition once sought to avoid.”).
272 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (1983) (“A lawyers shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to
direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”).
273 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (concluding that
Congress’s commerce power did not authorize the Affordable Care Act’s mandate for
people to buy health insurance, but nonetheless recognizing that the healthcare market itself
is a useful part of interstate commerce).
274 See supra Part II.B.
275 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (“[T]he Court has viewed with
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home
State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a
clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be
virtually per se illegal.”).
276 See supra Part IV.A.
277 See supra Part IV.A.
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battle: While it may be warranted, it would still be a significant divergence
from prior jurisprudence for the Court to strike down a state law regulating
professional practice.
If there is a basis to examine the corporate practice doctrine under
intermediate scrutiny, proponents of outside investment will have a much
greater chance of success. As other scholars have noted, applying either
rational basis review or strict scrutiny largely foretells the fate of the
challenged restriction; by contrast, applying an intermediate standard
“establishes a level playing field upon which conflicting state and private
interests do battle,” allowing the Court “to balance the private and state
interests involved with no clear rules detailing its approach.”278
An argument can be made in favor of bringing the corporate practice
doctrine within the scope of Carolene Products’ famous Footnote Four,279 and
thus examining the corporate practice doctrine with a higher level of
scrutiny.280 Forbidding physicians and attorneys from contracting for
employment with corporate entities restricts their freedom of speech and
freedom of association.281 The individual professionals cannot associate with
whom they choose, and they cannot seek to propose a variety of potential
commercial transactions for professional services. Likewise, corporations can
neither offer professional services in the commercial marketplace nor
communicate with clients about the possible benefits of selecting a particular
professional for legal or medical advice – communications that could assist
clients with retaining legal counsel or medical care of their choice.282

278 Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2808 (2005) (“Though descriptively vague,
intermediate scrutiny becomes clearer when viewed conceptually in conjunction with the
two alternative standards of review. If either rational basis review or strict scrutiny is
applied, then the outcome of the case is virtually preordained.”).
279 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth.”).
280 See Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis
Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1101 (2013) (“[O]ccupational licensing is arguably the strongest
candidate for heightened review under existing precedent.”).
281 See Knake, supra note 3, at 10 (examining “the question of whether or not a
corporation holds a First Amendment right to engage with lawyers for the purpose of
delivering legal services (and, of course, whether or not an individual holds a corresponding
interest in the delivery of those legal services)”).
282 The right to retain a doctor or lawyer of one’s choice is part of an individual’s liberty
interest. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380 (Mont. 1999) (recognizing “the
seriousness of the infringement of personal autonomy and privacy that accompanies the
government usurping, through laws or regulations which dictate how and by whom a
specific medical procedure is to be performed, the patient’s own informed health care
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Under current jurisprudence, restrictions on the freedom of speech are
scrutinized more highly than restrictions on the freedom of association; laws
restricting freedom of association in the commercial realm are generally
examined under the rational basis test, whereas laws restricting freedom of
speech in the commercial realm are examined under an intermediate scrutiny
standard.283 Traditionally, the intermediate scrutiny standard required the state
to meet a four-part test to justify content-based restrictions: first, that the
speech “concern[s] lawful activity and [is not] misleading”; second, that “the
asserted governmental interest is substantial”; third, that “the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted”; and finally, that the
restriction is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”284
Historically, the Supreme Court adopted a distinction between restrictions
on speech that proposed a commercial transaction (which was protected under
intermediate scrutiny) and “ordinary commercial or regulatory legislation that
affects speech in less direct ways” (which was reviewed under a rational basis
standard).285 But a pair of recent cases suggests that the Court may be moving
toward providing heightened protection of regulations that infringe on speech
rights; thus, even if the Court were willing to accept a “hypothetical” rational
basis for regulatory action, it might require an evidence-based rational basis for
regulatory action that infringes on speech.286
decisions made in partnership with his or her chosen health care provider”); Jerold H. Israel,
Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for
Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 360 (2001) (“The denial of the
opportunity to retain counsel was consistent with the settled usage in England, but not the
settled usage in this country, where recognition of a fundamental right to the assistance of
retained counsel of choice was widespread at the time of its founding.”).
283 Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm
Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 614 (1992) (“Under a First Amendment
approach, the freedom of association theory is hampered by the possible application of a
rational basis test of the legitimacy of the state’s regulatory scheme, while the commercial
speech theory is generally understood to apply to advertising rather than other forms of
conduct.”).
284 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
285 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (“Expression concerning
purely commercial transactions has come within the ambit of the [First] Amendment’s
protection only recently. In rejecting the notion that such speech ‘is wholly outside the
protection of the First Amendment,’ we were careful not to hold ‘that it is wholly
undifferentiable from other forms’ of speech. We have not discarded the ‘common-sense’
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.” (citations
omitted)).
286 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (majority opinion); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (“[C]ertain disfavored associations of citizens—those
that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political
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In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont law
that forbade pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies from using
prescription information for marketing purposes without the prescriber’s
consent.287 Although the State had argued that the “sales, transfer, and use of
prescriber-identifying information are conduct, not speech,” the Court easily
concluded this restriction constituted a “specific, content-based burden on
protected expression.”288 The harder question was whether it was a burden that
could stand under the commercial speech doctrine.289 Here, the State argued
that the law “advances important public policy goals by lowering the costs of
medical services and promoting public health” by discouraging the marketing
of more expensive brand-name medications when lower cost generic
medications might be equally effective.290 The Court did not disagree that the
State’s policy was a valid one, but it concluded that the goal was not strong
enough to overcome the public interest in free and unfettered information; it
stated that “the ‘fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful
information’ cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.”291 Thus, the
public’s interest in obtaining information trumped the State’s otherwise valid
attempt to regulate the commercial marketplace.
The second case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, likewise
focused on the listener interest in unfettered expression.292 In addition,
however, the Supreme Court added an admonition that “the Government may
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”
as “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech
of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”293 In Citizens United, the Supreme
Court struck down a federal law restricting corporate campaign
contributions.294 The Court concluded that restricting corporate speech
infringed on the individual’s rights by “command[ing] where a person may get
his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear,” and
that in so doing, the government unlawfully “uses censorship to control
thought,” as “[t]he First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for
ourselves.”295

speech . . . . This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for
ourselves.”).
287
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (“The State had burdened a form of protected expression
that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State has left unburdened those speakers
whose messages are in accord with its own views. This the State cannot do.”).
288 Id. at 2657, 2664.
289 Id. at 2664.
290 Id. at 2670.
291 Id. at 2670-71 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)).
292 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 372.
295 Id. at 356 (“When the Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal
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Professor Renee Knake has pointed out that Citizens United’s emphasis on
allowing individuals to obtain information from the sources of their choice,
whether corporate or individual, is inconsistent with current restrictions on the
corporate practice of law.296 The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to distinguish
between nonprofit and for-profit entities in Citizens United further strengthens
the argument in favor of applying heightened scrutiny to the corporate practice
doctrine; the Court had already struck down both an ethical rule that restricted
nonprofit and political advocacy groups from offering legal services and a
public funding restriction that prohibited funding recipients from challenging
the validity of state and federal statutes.297 The same argument applies in the
medical realm; Sorrell, after all, dealt with the public’s right to receive
information relevant to their health and medical care.298
In fact, Sorrell may provide an even stronger basis for exercising heightened
scrutiny over corporate practice restrictions.299 By emphasizing that
commercial speech is an important part of protecting the public’s access to
information – and that the public’s right to information should not be restricted
just because some people might use that information to make bad decisions – it
evokes the interests at issue in the market for professional services. People’s
right to legal and medical information is surely as strong as their right to
receive information about pharmaceuticals; certainly the right to counsel is
law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source
he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First
Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”).
296 Knake, supra note 3, at 36 (“[C]ommercial speech about the delivery of legal services
is inherently political speech, speech that goes to the heart of meaningful access to the law,
speech deserving of the strongest protection that the Constitution offers.”).
297 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (striking down a
restriction “prevent[ing] an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with
a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is
violative of the United States Constitution”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-49
(1963) (“We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on
this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal
profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of Chapter 33 and the Canons
of Professional Ethics.”); Knake, supra note 3, at 35-36 (“A word about Citizens United’s
impact on commercial speech is also warranted here. Professor Randall Bezanson argues . . .
‘it will be impossible in principle to treat commercial speech by corporations as anything
less than fully protected speech.’”).
298 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72 (2011) (“The State may not
burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction. ‘The
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum
where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government,
assess the value of the information presented.’” (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
763 (1993))).
299 Id.; see also Knake, supra note 3, at 32.
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protected under the Constitution,300 and a strong argument can be made that the
right to medical autonomy is protected as well.301 A state interest that is merely
protectionist or that attempts to preserve the status and dignity of the
profession would likewise fall to the public interest in free and unfettered
communication.302
Sorrell also clarifies that “access to information” is a part of the protected
speech interest.303 As the Court pointed out, “[a]n individual’s right to speak is
implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on
the way in which the information might be used’ or disseminated.”304
Prohibiting attorneys and physicians from accepting employment with
corporate entities that might provide legal services to the public certainly
restricts those professionals’ ability to disseminate information and provide
advice, and it similarly limits the public’s ability to access that information.
Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that that “free and uninhibited speech”
was constitutionally protected, even from paternalistic attempts to protect the
public from potentially harmful knowledge.305 These factors, combined with
Citizens United’s warning that “the Government may not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”306 suggest that the
Court should – at a minimum – inquire into the actual basis of state policies
supporting the corporate practice doctrine, and not merely defer to a

300

U.S. CONST. amend VI.
England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[T]he
State cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise a reasonable choice in the method
of treatment of his ills.”); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical
Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 345 (2007) (“The issue
of when governmental interests outweigh the individual right to protect one’s health through
making autonomous medical treatment choices is one that is not easily resolved, but it is
worthy of the sort of serious consideration it has not yet received.”).
302 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 647-48 (1985) (“[A]lthough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in ensuring
that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in the courtroom, we are unsure that the
State’s desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications with the public is
an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights.”).
303 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 (“An individual’s right to speak is implicated when
information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on the way in which the
information might be used’ or disseminated.” (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20, 32 (1984))).
304 Id.
305 Id. at 2671.
306 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“We return to
the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of non-profit or for-profit corporations.”).
301
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hypothetical wish for “independent” professionals – especially when that
independence restricts access without improving quality.307
Some scholars have concluded that Sorrell may portend a significant change
in the Supreme Court’s scrutiny of economic liberties.308 In particular,
Professor Tamara Piety has criticized the Court for “t[aking] a doctrine that
was conceived of as a species of consumer protection, and justified as
furthering the public interest, and turn[ing] it into a weapon against Vermont’s
effort to protect consumers and the public health, safety, and welfare,” and has
suggested that the case may signal a change in course for the future.309
Similarly, others have criticized the Court’s underlying premise that consumers
benefit from a robust commercial speech environment; if that premise is not
accepted, then commercial speech limitations may be an important part of
consumer protection.310 One possible limiting factor, however, is whether there
is in fact evidence that the challenged regulation is counterproductive to the
state’s articulated policy.311 Twenty years ago, the Seventh Circuit resisted a
constitutional challenge to corporate practice restrictions in law, concluding
that improving the quality of legal services was a rational state goal and that
there was no evidence “laypersons will be deprived of meaningful access to the
307

See supra Parts II & III.
Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v.
IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (2012) (arguing that the speaker-centric corporate
personhood recognized in Citizens United was “imported” into the commercial speech
doctrine by the Court in Sorrell “without explicitly overruling Central Hudson or
acknowledging that it was announcing a new standard by which to evaluate commercial
speech”); see also Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or
Resurrecting Lochner?, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 135 (“If heightened scrutiny is
to be applied to any commercial speech regulation that is based on the content of the speech
being regulated, one could reasonably conclude that all such regulations will be subject to
heightened scrutiny.”).
309 Piety, supra note 308, at 53 (“[T]he Court rendered the commercial speech doctrine
incoherent and sowed further confusion about what the appropriate test is. Armed with this
new (and inherently contradictory) ‘content-neutrality’ inquiry, the Supreme Court is in a
position to pick and choose and selectively invalidate those parts of the regulation of
commerce brought to it with which its majority disagrees.”).
310 See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 7-8 (“Citizens must be capable of making determinations that are both sophisticated
and intricately rational if they are to separate truth from falsehood. On the whole, current
and historical trends have not vindicated the market model’s faith in the rationality of the
human mind, yet this faith stands as a foundation block for most recent free speech theory.”
(citations omitted)).
311 Essentially, this would require using the Castille court’s “evidence of irrationality”
standard to negate state interests only when the asserted interests infringe on speech and
communication rights. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223, cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 423 (2013) (“[A]lthough rational basis review places no affirmative evidentiary burden
on the government, plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law
by adducing evidence of irrationality.”).
308
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courts if lawyers are unable to form partnerships with laypersons.”312 Now,
however, the evidence is much clearer that corporate practice restrictions do
not improve the quality of care, but do in fact reduce access to professional
services.313 Given the Supreme Court’s increasing recognition of a public
interest in free and unfettered commercial speech, it should allow courts to
consider this evidence in assessing the constitutionality of corporate practice
restrictions.
It is difficult to predict how, or whether, the Court’s recent cases will be
extended, and whether they will be used, as critics worry, to counteract state
regulation in general. Nevertheless, at least as far as a corporate practice
doctrine goes, the Court’s shift may suggest a reversion to the mean rather than
a step away from the center. As discussed previously, the Court’s extreme
deference to even hypothetical bases for state regulation of professional
services stands as a barrier to effective and affordable legal counsel and
medical care. Applying the more rigorous analysis of Sorrell and Citizens
United would, at a minimum, require an evidence-based justification for the
state’s restrictions on outside investment; it would no longer allow that interest
to remain vaguely stated and merely hypothetical. Once the hypothetical
justification is removed, however, it becomes apparent that there is no
evidence that corporate investment in professional services reduces quality or
infringes on independence; on the contrary, the evidence suggests that
loosening these restrictions would increase access to services without
diminishing quality. Unless and until proponents of the corporate practice
restrictions can articulate an actual threat to professional judgment or quality of
care, the prohibitions should be struck down.
CONCLUSION
By prohibiting professionals from freely contracting for corporate
employment and from obtaining outside investment, the corporate practice
doctrine distorts the market for professional services. In particular, the doctrine
causes difficulties at the low end of the market, limiting middle-income
individuals’ access to the market for professional service. Without this
restriction, corporations and outside investors could offer capital infusions that
would allow professional service providers to achieve economies of scale,
making it more affordable to serve a middle class market.314 Without such a
312

Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1387 (7th Cir. 1992); id. at 1385 (“Unless
a governmental regulation draws a suspect classification or infringes on a fundamental right,
the government need only show that its regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. . . . [T]he two rules in question meet this test because they are designed to
safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration
of justice from reproach.”).
313 See supra Parts II & III.
314 See supra Part II; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW 66 (1998) (explaining that with freedom of contract, “rights to use
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right, however, individuals’ access to the market for professional services
remains difficult; willing service providers lack the administrative ability and
financial cushion needed to connect with willing clients, even in cases where
the transaction would be beneficial to both parties.315 Political efforts to relax
the corporate practice restrictions have generally failed.316 Although few
onlookers defend corporate practice restrictions in theory, insiders –
established professionals who see corporate investment as a competitive threat
– have worked hard to defeat proposals that would open the professions to
outside investment.
The time is now ripe for a challenge to corporate practice restrictions in both
medicine and law. First, there is affirmative evidence in the medical field that
loosening corporate restrictions does not reduce the quality of care.317 Second,
and more importantly, it is becoming clear that the perfect is the enemy of the
good when it comes to access to professional services. In theory, the corporate
practice doctrine tries to insulate the public from bad advice by requiring that
physicians, attorneys, and other professionals remain economically
independent. In actuality, however, the public is not – and cannot be –
insulated at all; the information previously available only to licensed
professionals is now easily found on the internet,318 and professionals licensed
in other countries are both able and willing to provide their services to U.S.
clients.319
Evidence that the corporate practice doctrine restricts access to professional
care without improving its quality is significant, because the Supreme Court
appears to be moving toward a more evidence-based evaluation of legislative
action – especially in cases where that legislative action restricts speech. In
evaluating corporate practice restrictions, the Court may therefore require
something more than a mere hypothetical state interest to support the
restriction, regardless of whether it applies a contextual rational basis standard
“with bite” or whether it applies a more heightened level of scrutiny.320 Under
either standard, the Court should not merely accept the assertion that the public
could theoretically benefit from requiring professionals to remain
economically independent. The costs to access and affordability are too great,
and the public interest in communication too strong, to accept protectionist
impulses that have only a vague possibility of improved quality of care in the
professional realm. If proponents of the restrictions cannot show an actual – as
opposed to a hypothetical – public benefit, then the corporate practice
restrictions should fall.
resources are permitted to flow to those who believe they know best how to use them”).
315 See supra Part II.
316 See supra Part IV.
317 See supra Part III.
318 See supra Part III.A.
319 See supra Part III.B.
320 See supra Part IV.

